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. by them was clearly established at the time of their challenged . conduct, if they knew or should have known of that right, and if they knew or should known that their conduct violated the consti- tutional norm." [Slip Op. 59.] Second, the defense is unavailable "Where the official has sated ‘with ‘malicious intention’ to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right or to cause him other injury." id. See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978). 37. . ~ . the majority concludes Focusing on the first part of this test, that "defendants have not shown as. a matter of law that they should not have known either that [plaintiffs' constitutional] rights existed or that their alleged conduct violated them." Id. at 60. However, an examination of the major elements which Judge Swygert uses to link the federal defendants with the alleged misdeeds-of the State officials demonstrates that all the federal officials-were doing was supplying. information, pursuant to FBI directives, in circumstances where they had no reason to believe that their actions in supplying this infor- mation violated constitutional-norms. It must be kept in mind that we are not dealing here with sophisticated constitutional lawyers, but simply FBI field agents. The Supreme Court has indicated that FBI agents have broad authority (compare, e.g., Dalia v. United a - . : . . ‘a . 3/ <Judge Swygert's opinion says "There is no need to examine the second branch" but then infers that there is a jury question as to the defendants' actual intent [Slip Op. 60]. Since the opinion does not discuss this branch of the test separately, it is apparent that the evidence Judge Swygert relies upon is the same evidence he used to find that federal appellees cannot claim qualified immunity as a matter of law under the first branch. As we show in the text, this evidence would not permit a jury to draw any inference of improper conduct.