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t . Ste en ce cata teat ae tte eileen a oft al dee sees es Rempel me pipette bbe, annie eee ten be nme ee -2- At 1654:10 the FAA local controller cleared the Learjet for take- off and to maintain "niner thousand." After the aircraft was airborne the crew contacted Palm Springs departure control and reported "out of" 1,500 feet and climbing to 9,000 and the controller requested they report reaching 9,000. The controller then requested the flight to "report crossing 051 radial 10 mile fix." The flight responded "okay" and ten seconds later the controller transmitted "and that's the Palm Springs 051 radial, sir," and again the flight responded "okay. "' Subsequently, at 1656:25 the Learjet crew reported they had “crossed the radial."' The crew did not specify the ‘Palm Springs 051 degree radial" or the "10 mile fix,'' both of which were included in the clearance. The Board said that the flightcrew's report that they had crossed the radial "was erroneous’ because the Palm Springs 051 degree radial exists in the northeast quadrant of the VORTAC and the flight never entered that area. The Board concluded that when the crew re- ported they had crossed the radial they were actually crossing the Palm Springs 231 degree eadial which is the reciprocal course of the Paim Springs 051 radial, At the same time when the controller received this report he assumed" that the crew were crossing the Palm Springs 051 radial at the 10 mile fix, as specified in the ciearance. ‘ The Board said it is difficult to rationalize how the flightcrew con- cluded that the runway heading of 300 degrees -- which led them from the point of takeoff directly into the mountains -- was to be maintained. The Palm Springs controller cleared the flight, in part, to Las Vegas "via Palm Springs, direct Twenty-nine Palms.'' Based on the existing regulations the Board concluded that the pilot was required to fly on the straight line course between these two points, which meant turning off the 300 degree runway heading as soon as practical after takeoff. “The — sr ate to es POS IRR Ber cra re pence bere ees controller had specifically defined the point at which the Learjet was ‘T report along its cleared route; crossing the Palm Springs 051 degree radial 10 mile fix." "There was no way this fix could be reached by maintaining the runway heading," the Board said, "and no request was en levied on the flightcrew to hold runway heading after takeoff. The Board noted that one possible explanation for the crew's mis- interpretation of their clearance could have been that the crew were unaware they were operating in non-radar environment and believed they were under radar control. However, at the time of the accident the Palm Springs Tower had no radar capability. Consequently, until the Learjet reached about 9,000 feet -- the lowest altitude that the Los Angeles Center radar could pick up its transponder target -- no radar information was available to monitor the Learjet's progress. It was not until "just before impact" that the Los Angeles Center's radar picked up the Learjet on their radarscope but there was not sufficient time to establish radio contact with the Might and vector it away from the mountain. Thus, without radar, the Palm Springs departure