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bt however, is conditioned on progress being made in in Soviet territory to be manned in part by non- the negotiations on various important issues that now separate the two sides and on arrangements being made for a coordinated research program aimed at finding more reliable means of identify- ing small underground disturbances. However, there are stil] important political and» - technical issues to work out. Agreement must * gti) be reached on such critical matters as the - basis and frequency of on-site inspections of areas * where unidentified seismic events have ‘occurred - qithin the territories of the parties. This is a major obstacle. The Soviets insist that the num- ber of such inspections should be limited and based on a purely political decision. We believe that this is not a political question but that inspections should be based on detection capabilities and scien- tific facts. Still another matter at issue is the composition of the staff manning the control posts which will be established within the three countries and through- out the world: The Soviets wish to have a pre- dominance of host-country nationals in the control posts. We cannot accept this since it would amount to self-inspection. In the light of the need to insure objectivity, we have proposed that the control posts be manned by an international staff made up of one-third host-country nationals, one-third from the other side, and one-third from other countries. Further issues include voting procedures, where the shadow of the veto is still with us, procedures to govern explosions for peaceful purposes, and the composition of the seven-nation control commission. However, in the 18 months of painstaking and patient negotiations—a prerequisite for conduct- ing diplomatic talks with the Soviets—we have reached agreement on & preamble and 17 draft articles and an annex of a treaty, as well as certain important technical matters.’ ; The most significant point is that the Soviets have agreed to the establishment of contro] posts * Copies of the agreed documente (drafts of a preamble and various articles of a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests, together with a draft annex on @ preparatory commission) are available upon request from the Office of Public Services, Department of State, Washb- ington 25, D.C. May 23, 1960 549841—60-—8 “Soviet personnel-to-verify-compliance with the _ rome a ae inn treaty. Thus there is some basis for cautious op- timism at that conference, and we can only hope that some of this optimism will pervade the ad- joining conference room, where the disarmament negotiators will be meeting when they resume their talks in June. Do the Soviets Want Disarmament? -In view of the frustrations we have experi- enced over many years in trying to negotiate dis- armament arrangements with the Soviet Union, people often ask whether the Soviets really want disarmament. I do not pretend to know the an- swer, but I would suggest that there may be several reasons why the Soviet Union should be genuinely interested in agreement on disarmament. First of these is the very human fear of the devas- tation that would be visited on all peoples alike by a total nuclear war. The ravages of World War II in destruction of their manpower and capital plant and equipment must have left a profound impression on the Communist leaders. They are intelligent men, and they must be able to visualize the incomparably greater ravages which s nu- clear war would bring. In the second place, the burden of supporting military establishments in the nuclear age is ex- tremely costly both in men and materials. The losses of World War II also resulted in a defi- ciency in Soviet manpower, & particularly critical problem in light of the intensive Soviet campaign to increase industrial output and reclaim Jands in Siberia. There are also increasing demands by Soviet citizens for more of the comforts of life. It is difficult to know exactly how much of a role each of these considerations might play in Soviet policy formulation, but there can be no denying the increasing competition for the resources and the productive energies of the state. There are certainly other considerations as well. These could involve such matters as Soviet assess- , ment of the balance of military advantage in any disarmament agreement, their estimate of the political advantages that might be derived from any such agreement, and their relative view of the prospects for achieving their objectives by either military or nonmilitary means. wee ee ey x 2 A 3 i i z Hi : i i H } ret ran