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ca a * loses, we are not strong enough to defend ourselves; that we may be invaded by air- craft from the Greenland ice cap, or even by transatlantic parachute troops descend- ing on our city streets. They have already led us far along the road to war—the same road that we traveled in 1917; then too at their behest, But there is one all-important difference between the European war when we entered it in 1917, and the European war today. It is this difference which must be brought to the attention of every American, for the entire future of our nation hangs upon it. It is, that when we entered the last war we could see how victory covld be won, but today we cannot. In 1917, the Central Powers were fighting France and Great Britain in the west, Russia in the éast, ana Italy in the south. The German armies had already suffered severe reverses. Even Japan had entered the war on the Allied side. In 1941, however, we face an entirely different situation. Germany has conquered France. She has an alliance with Italy, Rusia and Japan -- three hundred million ople. Her armies control the coast of urope from Spain to the Arctic Ocean. British shipping logses are already of the --. -atmost seriousness, and the major ports and industrial centers of England have been heavily bombed. The fact is that America is not in a pasi- tion to wage a successful war in Europe ander present conditions. We, ourselves, are not prepared, and even if we were, where would we send our soldiers te fight? How are we to force a Janding on the European continent against the prepared positions of the strongest military power in the world? If the British, French and Belgian armies combined could not hold the fortifications they had spent years in building along the German border, how can we be expected to eross the Atlantic Ocean and invade the continent of Europe against the opposition of the same army, navy and air force that thrust the British fleet Irom the coast of Norway, and broke the Maginot Line? The people who shouted for England and France to declare war in 1939 called for Suicide and defeat. Because of their hys- teria and blindness, the bravest men of France and England marched to disaster and to death. While the jnteliectuais of Europe preached of Christianity, democracy and idealism, they threw a wave of human flesh against a fortified concrete line — without adequate guns, or tanks, or aircraft even for defense, to say nothing of attack. Has this attitude of life succeeded? Has it gained freedom for France or security for England? Has it stamped out aggres- sion or heightened civilization? Has democ- ‘racy gained or has it lost through such leadership? These are questions that we in America must answer. With failure in Europe before our eyes, shall we follow this same course? Shall we throw ourselves into war in a fervor of idealism, shouting abovt how we think the world should be ron? Or shall we discuss calmly how our objectives can be accomplished, and ade- quately prepare ourselves to reach them? Personally, I believe that by our with- drawal from Eurone after the last war, and our failure to prepare for this one many years ago, we are already committed to a policy of military “isolation.” I be- lieve that if we abandon this policy at the present time, we are courting national disaster, just as France and England courted disaster when they, unprepared, ' declared war over the German invasion of Poland. A nation cannot change overnight from an attitude of peace to an attitude of war. It takes many years of planning and Preparation before great military strength ean be attained. I believe it is not any longer a question of what we wish to do in this war, but rather one of what we cax do. I believe that for us te enter the con- flict In Europe at this time would result in defeat and humiliation. If we are to enter such a conflict successfully, then we must prepare for it not for one year or for two, but for ten years or for twenty a8 Germany has done. On the other hand, I believe that we can build a military and commercia) position on this continent that is impregnable to attack, and which will foree other nations to trade with us, if through expediency alone. Even if America intended eventually to dominate the entire world, as some people now seem to want us to do, I would say that our first step should be to consolidate our de- fenses at home, ec that we could prepare ourselves in safety for our adventures be- yond the seas. . . Every difficulty we would have in invading Europe would be an advantage for us in defending America. Our armies would be fighting on home soil, our Navy would be close to its hases, our alr force could strike with its utmost effect. It would be the enemy's probiem, not ours, to crosé the ocean with millions of troops and their supplies, ‘our bombing planes, and to force a ding on American shores against the mg of our cogst artillery and our Army. ‘When England could not hold the coast afer. cosxineat ¢he German air farce: Norway against the ‘serman Slr Tore; When the British navy dared not remain in thé Skagerrak, or even permanently in the North Sea; when the German military ma- chine, after crashing through the Maginot Line and routing the French army and the British expeditionary force, has been held up for nine months by twenty-five miles of English Channel—how is any navy to ap- roach the shores of America and land an invading army against the combined resist- ance of our military forces? There has been much discussion of an air invasion of America, This is partially due to propaganda, partially te hysteria and partially, I believe, to a misconception of the so-called “sir invasions” of Norway and Holland by the German air force. Peraon- ally, although I think the effectiveness of military aviation is stil] underestimated, I do not believe there is the slightest danger af a wuroly sir invacion of America now. & Purely Gir invasion Of America now; é et Pass by our submarines, our battleships, or at any time we can now foresee. To be- gin with, the distance across the oceans is far too great to permit the air transport of armies large enough to invade us suc- cessfully, even if one assumes that they had a place to land unopposed by our own mili- tory forres, Bnt, aside from the question of distance, we should be reassured by the fact that there has never been a successful in- vasion by air alone. The outstanding ex- amples of the use of aviation for invasion of enemy territory occurred during the Ger- man occupations of Norway and Hoiland. But in each of these instances. the landing of troops by air was carried on simultane- ously with the movement of ground and naval forces on a major scale. The maxi- mum number of troops that could have been transported and supplied by air would have been ineffective without the immediate sup- port of a ground army. If air invasion alone coul? be successful, it would have been used by the Germans against England many months ago, But what about the northern routes, ery the alarmists; won't we be invaded by way of Greenland and Alaska, where the dis- tances between land are short? Possibly the best answer te this question is in the form of another: Why, if these northern Toutes are 30 advantageous, do you suppose the commercial airlines to Europe and Asia prefer the great overwater distances far- ther south? The answer is that ice and fog and bitter cold atill force men southward in their questa of commerce and of war. Ex- _ crews of 5 cept in adventure and exploration, me low the routes which offer the gr safety and require the least effort — these are not in the north. Of all the transatlantic air route simplest to fly is the one that lies be Africa and South America. This fi being used today in much of the war | ganda we hear. German airplanes, ¥ told, will fly to Africa by the thou hop across the ocean to South Americ iuei and fiy up and invade the United & Leaving aside the problems that have to be solved in Europe and . before thousands of German air could take off on such a venture, let u sider what preparations would have made for their arrival in South Ame in Brazil, to be apecific. There would to be dozens of previously prepare dromes, equipped with tanks and fu skilled mechanics, All of th and supplies required would have transported by sea. In fact many transports and tens of thousands of men would have to he busy for mont fore the necessary landing facilities be arranged. So that when anyone spe an air invasion via Africa and South / en, he presupposes that Germany ha the war in Europe; that the countris has conquered are either so well sa or Bo completely subdued that she i to devote her attention to an inte spherical struggle (with Asia always. back door); that she has Africa als in hand; and finally that she has, in ¢ tion to the armed forces of Brazil bac! our own Army, Navy and Air Corps able to construct and supply the nec airdromes in eastern South America. After that, of course, it is still f from eastern Brazil to the contine North America than it was from Ge originally, so other groups of air would have to be established, farther before enemy planes based in South J ea Would have any advaniage over planes based on their home airpo urope. And since there are no rai through that portion of South Ar these bases too would have to be esta! yy sea. No, the more one etudies the pr thé more obvious it becomes that | invasion of America is entirely out question. Invading forces would hi come by sea, and if they made such tempt, it would be our American a that flew out to meet them and d all aha wat: at mblnan fm thn ws. tin the most impregnable position of d We have highly developed industries, national resources and a population | hundred and thirty million people which to draw. There is not a nat this hemisphere strong enough even ¢ sider attacking nz. We are flanked | Atlantic Ocean on the east, and the on the west. In the north, we are pr by the wastelands of the Arctic. WI all history, has a nation been si blessed? Then why in our maturi more than in our youth, “Why, bj weaving our destiny with that of a) of Europe, entangle our peace ant perity in the toils of European ar rivalship, interest, humor or caprice It is often asked today why our 1 ment program moves so slowly, w eople are so divided and confused. indeed! The answer is clear. It is ' we have neglected the wisdom and ence of our forefathers—we have 1 lowed Washington’s advice. We have destiny of America become confus entangled with that of foreign lan leaders have attempted to transfer for our own country to loyalty for of Europe.” One portion of our ped