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Cambridge Five Spy Ring — Part 15

83 pages · May 09, 2026 · Broad topic: Intelligence Operations · Topic: Cambridge Five Spy Ring · 83 pages OCR'd
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Parliament | continued from page and any previous employment before joining the Foreign Service. SYSTEM EXTENDED Since 1951 some 900 cases, involving the senior, junior, and clerical branches of the Foreign Service, had been examined. 5o far, there had been four cases in the Foreign Service ip hich an officer's political activi- "tics and Ssdocistions had led to his leaving jthe servi Aaliogether: In some half dozen {other cages it had been considered prudent 1t0 move Officers lo other work of less im- gporiance to the national security, or to accept their resignations, That positive “ vetting” procedure was Not confined 10 the Foreign Service. It was fow operated in aii Governmeni depari- ments having access to classified material involving the security of the Stale. Immediately after the disappearance of Maciean and Burgess Mr. Morrison, then Foreign Secretary, set up a committee to look into all aspecis of the security arrange- ments- in the Foreign Service. The com- Mitlee was an official one, which was a wise act of Mr. Morrison, who. chose oflicials singularly well suited to their task, Men with great records of devotion to the public service, The committee was presided over by Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Sir Nevile F'and and Sir Norman Brook, Secre- tary ta the Cabinet, were the other members tt 7 "The committee reported in November, 1951, approving the security check, includ- ing the plans for positive “ vetting * which ; had already been prepared. It recommended that “ vetting ” should be extended to all members of the senior branches and the senior grades of the junior branches of ihe Foreign Service. The present practice of the Foreign Office went beyond that recommendation, since many more juniof grades, which must inevitably be employed on highly classified work, were positively vetted, CHARACTER DEFECTS The committee considered not only politi- cal unreliability in itself, but the problem of character defecis which might Jay an officer open to blackmail, or otherwise undermine. his sloyalty and sense of res- i ponsibility. . Shortly after the disappearance of Mac- é lean and Burgess, and before the Cadogan ee eee chit H committee reported, fresh instructions had heen issued by the Permanent Under-Secre- tary of the Foreign Office _to heads of missions and other senior officials impress- ing on them the need io watch, in parti- cular, the forms of behaviour among their staff likely to sap an officer’s discretion or sense of responsibiliiy or his public duiy, or io expose him io Undue inMuence or blackmail, or to heighten the tension of his existing behaviour. . The committee commented on those in- structions with approval. lt was sometimes said that recruliment for the Foreign Service was kept to a closed ”~. narrowly from one social group. The selection of recruits for all except the most junior grades had for a long time been in the hands of the Civil Service Commis- sioners. The Foreign Service was not a service Tenewing itself by co-option, It was sometimes said that the Foreign Service, Eke the rest of the Civil Service, was a Sorttof closed shop, that its failures were preétected, and that there was no means of -getiing rid of incompetent or unsuitable" people. Since the introduction of the Foreign Service Act, 1943, members of the Foreign Service had not enjoyed the same degree of security as that of the rest of ihe Civit Service, for that Act mitro- duced arrangements more like those of the fighting Services, which pravided for com- pulsory retirement of established members who did not make sufficient progress 10 justify their retention or promotion. It seemed that ihe case for a further tion of the Foreign Service bad noi becn made out. aA Mrmr AWAIAL. VELA £.. circuit, and that its members were taken too: - jngniry into ihe recruitment and organiza-— eventually narrowed il down to one, but in this case, unlike the Fuchs case, ihey were unable to obtain sufficient evidence Lo ustify a charge. This was !o be regretted, we ihe difficulties under the British system of law were very real, Of the skill, perseverence, and loyalty of the securily service there could be no doubt. |fand he paid tribute to the fact that the ‘Government were able to recruit to-day vmen of such high calibre and auantments. pRewards were nol very large and responsi- bilities were very great. . Most people gained some satisfaction in life not only from doing a job well but also from the pubiic acknowledgment oi success: these men were cut off from. ail that. They worked in secret. Most of their guccesses—and there were, indeed, successes —had to be kept quiet. Only failure hit the headlines. For this service, then, not failure but patriotism was the spur and the reward. (Cheers.} BRITAIN'S REPUTATION Of the more general aspects of security, he was satisfied, and hoped the House would be satisfied, that the new arrange- menis had enormously strengthened the security system. He doubted whether any substantial improvernents could be made within the existing system of law, Unfortu- nately, it was not sufficient to satisfy them- selves that they had taken al] possible steps. It could not be ignored that this inci- dent, following upon others in the world of science had had « serions aff of science, had had a senous eMect om Britain’s reputation abroad. (Cheers.) Ik was inevitable. Many of the allegations made by itresponsible people were so exag- gerated that they carried with them their own refutation, nevertheless there was a real danger that a feeling might be spread among Britain's allies that Britain's relia~ biiity—hitherto regarded as a modei—was no Jonger to be trusted. It was of great importance to the coun- try’s defence and safety that successive Governments should be known to have taken ail steps within their power ta stop any loopholes and strengthen any legiti- mate methods of defending vital secrets. It was his belief that every practical means had been taken that was open to the executive, and he appealed to those con- cerned not to injure further the country’s interests by spreading abroad a faise and sul more outdated picture of the security syslem as it was to-day. DISTASTEFUL MEASURES There had been no dispute about the character of the régime since 1689 in Eng- jand and 1745 in Scotland. Bitter as had been the political conflicts at certain times, there had been no question of serious acts of treachery to the country. One had to go back io ihe wars o7 religion jo find any parallel with the new ideological conflicts which divided the world, and might con- tinue to divide it for many years. One could not imagine a state of mind which regarded spying as a virtue and treachery as a duty, which brought a new problem— that of public security in a free society— (Cheers}—during periods of intense ideo- logical warfare. The Goverament could have reintroduced some methods or retaken powers which were abandoned long ago, and which it was hoped had gone forever—even in a modified form—and these would have been very helpful. The story might casily have heen unravelled if Jess regard had been paid to the law. . He had been struck by a criticism which had appeared in a popular newspaper asking why Mrs. Maclean had not been prevented from leaving England ? The article said the authorities fad stated they would have had no jegal power io do 80, ald went of 1G ask if they could nor have found one. (Laughter,)) That was the very hub of the problem. Hitler would have found one. Mussolini would have found one. Sralin had got one. (Laughter.) In time of war, Britain, too, was forced to find new -mgasur e1o-cOnire Lents of the individuai, but they naa never been very much Jiked, and he did not suppose there was any product of war more dis- me ~ I life ‘uan at any time in history, Nowadays it ye not only the bureaucracy which het ona secrets ; perhaps more impor- tat Tets were in the hands of large secti. of industry and the scientific world. With this extension of the problem, the Governmant were brought face to face with the fundamental quesyon of how the in- teresis of security ‘Gould be maintained without damage to traditional liberties. At what point did reasonable and neces- Sary sécurily measures become the repug- nant atlributes of the police State ? fi short, how, in modern times, did one secure good security in a democratic society 7 The review he had given of the security measures taken in recent years would, he hoped, convince the House that everything it was possible to do under the existing law had been done to protect the nation against treason and subversion by Govern- ment servants or by others who had secret material. To the extent that security prac- tices could be improved under the existing laws every effort ad been made to achieve it. He believed that_these measufes made a ‘recurrence of an affair such as this exceed- ingly improbable—he would not say im- possible—~but he must repeat that the gneasures did not and could not go beyond the letter and the spirit of the existing law, (Cheers.) At any rate, before the limitations of the existing law were relaxed ‘Parliament would have to weigh carefully the balance of advantage and disadvantage, for it would be a tragedy indeed if we were to destroy our freedom in the effort to preserve it. (Loud cheers.) MR. MORRISON’S DOUBTS... - CALL FOR INQUIRY MR. MORRISON said that the House had heard a full and competent speech from the Secretary of State, and although agreeing with most of it he was not as fully satisfied as Mr, Macmillan was. Everyone felt that the Burgess and Mac- fean incident Was & disgrace iG ihe cowniry. Ji was also an unhappy incident for the security services. But the House must keep a sense of proportion: the number of cases of this kind among men employed in the public service was very limited. The evidence against these two men richt up to their departure was insufficient 1o warrant decisive action on charges of espionage. If they had been arrested and ultimately found innocent that would have brought discredit on the Forcign Office and the security services. He was inclined to think the ports ought ‘en have hase alartad but ha did wat baaw (1G Mave OOOH alTica, Gut me did not know what could have been done effectively. It would have been useful to know imme- diately when they had gone and by what route, and they might have been followed, but he did not think passports could be withdrawn... MR. MACMILLAN said it was nassible to refuse a passport, but it was not possible effectively to withdraw it. The only effec- ttve way would be to apply to a court and one would have to have evidence. Mr. Morrison said he was inclined to think that Maclean was tipped off by someone, because it was a remark- ablé coincidence thai tie (MT, Morrison} given should have the order for the questioning of Maclean on May 25 and the two men were missing that aight. He had received a letter from a_ friend, whose judgment of men and affairs he Tespected. He had asted for his name not to be given—though it was available to the Foreign Office if they wanted it-—because he did not want to be pursucd with pub- licity in this matter. His letter said:— 1 was very interested to read your remarks about Maclean and Burgess the other day, because 1 know them both and. actually lunched with Maclean the day before he “disappeared. The point I wanted to mention to you was that on the day I am sure he had no intention J It l gg EL wf laguna an the. sway be did _wdesneke, Cou, fore told him not the In t incide! hensio should tion, Forcig proble ine 5 Such ; comm The securit and } satisfic Cleart nor c could of es; might in pri Prime cover: cillors and ¥ ally c must be sa sort 3 count actior eyner exper to th 1 co and | NLAIO Otto chief 1954, It thing could men remal the ¢ taine M] said | the \ the n palpa the | piess stron was | intro night right of tl Offic vice, mine Offic M that servi reass inqu genc be c M Nort an a cil top misr and quir’ espic be 1 M that ther crac pers M ling for. of a M ri
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