◆ SpookStack

1950 might have warrk “im that his activis diss-in“the United = s “might becuse covereds“Looking ba. — they wondered ff this led to his breakdown in Cairo ii 2930. Although the circumstances~of the “6ls- appearance were explainable in terms of a tip-off, it was quite possible that Maclean fled with Burgess because one or other noticed circumstances or a combination of be | circumstances which aroused their sus . pistons. The possibility of a tip-off had to s decided tog std [be seriously considered, and searching and n for a peri of i ili en of ‘¢ Far Eastern depart- orking in that depart- - made that during @ \, late in 1949, he had sus indiscretion about ‘he charges were fylly ‘isciplinaty board; he anded; and informed nsferred and that his omotion’ “would é ‘protracted investigations into the possibility sk. There ha fad heen undertaken and were now aving been gue i bt that proceeding. _ he was promoted, Tha ined, as he bad been MR. H. A. R. PHILBY ent, a member of the | The name of one man had been men- “junior branch of the | tioned in the Honse, but not outside, in this opnnexion. He was Mr. H. A. R. Philby, temporary First Secretary to the British Embassy in Washington from Qcto- ber, 1949, to June, 1931, who had been rivy to much of the investigation of the eakage. He had been friends with Burgess from their time as_fellow undergraduates in Trinity College, Cambridge, and Burgess was accommodated at his home in Washing: ton from August, 1950, to Apri, 1951, Tt would be realized that at no time before he fied was Burgess under suspicion, it had been found that Mr. Philby had Communist associations before and after bis university days, and he was asked in 1951 to resign from the Foreign Office bj : Mr M iby had best evidence had been found that he was responsible for warming Burgess and Maclean. While in Govern- ment service he carried out his duties ably and conscientiously. There was no reason io conclude tha: he had, at any time, betrayed the interesis of Britain, of to identify him with the so-called third man, if there was one, As regard others whose names had been associated with the affair, he hid caused them to be carefully studied and investi- gatcd, No one was being shielded. Had any evidence of guilt been forthcoming he, oc his predecessors, would not have hesiiated to have taken appropriate action. No such evidence had been found. ‘A number of Foreign Service officers who had been either office colleagues or had associated outside with Burgess were €xam- ined but nothing had been ound. if anyone inside or outside the House could produce evidence he trusted it would be made avail- able 10 ihe authorities. MR. HERBERT MORRISON (Lewi- sham, South, Lab.j.—It is said in a news paper that Mr. Philby and his family have disappeared. Docs the Minister regard that as significant in the circumstances of the casa MR. MACMILLAN.--I have no reason toa think they have left this country. 1 think it is very improbable. — ; Mrs. Maclean had been of Jittle import- ance, Anything she knew before Maclean left she must have got from him, and she had no means of obtaining information gfier he left, Whether she remained in: Britain or left made litle diffcrence. She. could do no geod in this couniry and Burgess was a failure. reported = untavourably : work and behaviour y. 1951, four years after and nine monihs afier 4} Washington, he was onclusion reached that leave the service. Until ‘Sappearance there were ‘ect that he was workin y of the State. He had jt then indiscretion was haracteristic of a Becret ation a further point, in tcNeil. He had observed lintster, -a Bri Crain. ted that he ha warned it’ Burgess when he be- assistant. He (Mr. Mac- -orry about the timing of elation, (Hear, hear 2 TO RUSSIA STIGATED FOR EVIDENCE had said enough to show as not irue that the two ed by senior officials. 149 & report was received sh information had become wet authorities & few years as no indication of haw it dable. The leak might_not from British sources. Dili- eve begun immediately, but sibilities to be covered was nce came gradually to light, ‘o the credit of ihe security the circumstance that infor- rked to the Soviet Govern: nown at all—he could not +, but it was an almost in- skill—~and, given the magni- n. the breadth of the possible paucity of the information ‘at ihe field was gradually + in the course of two years, ‘and that the right one. ‘he suspicion narrowed down the evidence was both in- d. circurnstaniial. The best, nly, chance of obtaining evi-e | Lice harm abroad. could de used to support a ay in.oabiaining admissions it there was no firm starting CLOSER SCRUTINY | pee ante interview, It w. i cn _ ” TAT Marte Ee cinterview. M ronnagien about |S 10° OFFICIALS. MOVED “=~ and activities ¥ ¢ could be | The next question was what sleps were ~ ASE este W im. 7 ASherefore put onehim. ‘The taken to ancure that there should be na ip watch him at his home at repetition of such a deplorable story. Since deliberately 1aken, after a care. | 1945 a check had regularly been made on vad been made of the technical | all new entrants jnto the Foreign Service calved in keeping him under and on all new temporary emptoyces. in the neighbourhood of his That check was made 10 ensure that mo onelusion was that the risk that adverse security record was held against > put on his guard would b¢ toa | candidates for employment. Since 1948 all officers already employed had been so checked, but it was acknowledged that that check was nol adequate—what was called the negative check—since it only revealed rsons who had alteady come to the un- avourabie notice of ihe security authori«.. tics. When applied to Maclean and Bur- gess ii revealed nothing about the subversive CIRIES CONTINUING se of Fuchs, the security service lake exactly the same risk and istified in the result, —t of the watch on Maclean dances contact ar some-