◆ SpookStack

o- ae ey al 4 tha - 4 * +, e 4 n C 1} t Teo ey ee ee AR A ter ey EE Ot | Burgessand Maclean f the call Pe }é. Burgess aclean chatted! freely with us’and two Russian ¢prfespondents, : but dodged! very question we put to them, | d ‘refused to let us read the. ftatement until they had Teil! _On,arrival they had produced | the copies of the statement} rom a brown leather dispatch) tase which Burgess carried. They said they had asked Tass to arrange a meeting “because we wanted to make a state- ent.” | Both wore neat, pin- striped | auits, wpberently’ of. English make. i They, amoked a cheap brand, af Russian clgaret nglish cigarels them: _} They broke off the interview) _ after 5 minutes by standing up; at the table at which they sat! and shaking hands with the newsmen. }Outside the hotel, they ‘paused for a moment before; crossing Gorky street, Moscow's main thoroughfare, and chatted with me as I asked whether they had any message te send, to relatives. ~*~ | ‘Burgess, who seemed as con- fdent as Maclean wag-ill at ease, repHed:: ~- = --. a | “would like to send a mes-| gage to my mother. I think of, her constantly, and J hope to’ write to her as soon as I can.’ ;Maclean, asked if he also had a message, answered: “I will be communicating myself,” “Then, they set of on font theough the fog covering Mos- ceca in the direction of a build- ing occupied by the Soviet Gov- ton -Central Administra- ‘ rottowing is the text of the Burgess-Maclean statement, .as transmitted ‘by Associated Press ‘and as’ broadcast by Moscow Radio: © ““Tt seems to us doubts and speculatién as to our presenti whereabouts and our former ac- tivity may represent 2a small but <signifigca@t factor whith _has hithert@ been used and may again be u by opponents of Angio-Soviet ' nderstanding. {s of fered to! - i "In view of these considera- tions, we thought it better to _publish his. statement. : “We ‘arrived ‘in ' U rder to éontribution to a policy aimed| et achieving greater mutua} understanding between the So- yiet Union and the West, hav- ing become convinced on the Wasis of official information which was at our disposal of| the fact that neither the British, for still more ,the American - policy at that time was serious- ly pursuing this object. ° “The position which we -oc- fupiea gave us every reason to hink such a mutual under- standing: absolutely necessary jf we wish to preserve peace,’ Endorsed Red Policy - i “We had every reason for toming to the conclusion that! + fe" mutual understanding was @ object of Soviet policy. 1 “We had every possibility to now the plans of a small but -bowerful group of men who op- osed the achievement of such ’ mutual understanding and for this reason we had grounds to fear these plans. : "When we were in Cam- bridge, we were both Commu- Bists—we ceased our political activities, not because we were to any extent not in agreement with Marxist analysis of the situation which we still observe at the present moment, but be- gause as has now become clear us, we wrongly presumed that being in the service of the state, we could more than any- a Where else put into practice our ideals. : “Wrongful interpretation of eur actions—the need to cease political activities when enter- hg the service of the state— apparently Jed to the statement of the Foreign Office that the Forelgn Office presumes that we had become Soviet agents dn Cambridge. «'“The Forefgn Office can,-of pourse, presume anything it|- wishes. But what matters is that we, not the Foreign office, ‘pre competent in this question. i “We, neither of us have ever been Savloet agents, H : “Up to that moment the paths of our lives were alike. ; “Later, the career of each of} or this reason It wil be better | e them separate a ing al] this time, he symna- FEB 12 1958 ihined with Soviet goucee every} ‘is followed a different course.{/oiMed the BBC. Later, he was: . “XE Tegards Maclean, t- Yn the official diplory’ aerve in London and P ash- gton and Cairo from 1935 to 951, thus being part of the machine which, with the ex- feeption of the war period, was ursuing a policy unacceptable ot only.to Maclean but also to: any ers. “He was by no means the only ne in the Foreign Office to ‘fexpress before the war his nee. ‘tative attitude toward Britain's foreign policy, particularly as regards Abyssinia (Ethiopia), the civil war in Spain and the Munich events. “However, after the war he alone “It was becoming increasjng- F difficult to find anyone to [atone himself more and more think of something else than the Communist menace, to un- {derstand the senselessness and tanger of American policy. in ythe Far East and Europe. “To remain further in the ! diplomatic service waS becom- ‘ing impossible, In May, 1951, ‘ there were clear signs that iwhatever plans fle may have| } been making for his future, the: ?Foreign Office and the secu- ‘rity, organs had their own In- a tentions in regard tp him, - : “The telephones “both in his ‘@ffice and at his home, we ' Being used as ; microphones f stening in. Counterespiona genta followed him where ‘ ba went, and one of his co leagues was sent to him for’ rey |vocative purposes. “For this reason, Mclean ide-/. cided to go to the Soviet Union injorder to contribute fom thqre, to the best of his ability,|: to fhe achicvements of mutual understanding between East and West. Meeting With Burgess “The difficulty of leaving the ‘country while under police sur- \veillance was solved by a meet- Hing with Burgess who had just. returned to London from Wash-| ington, where he was occupying a post in:the British Embassy. “The latter not only agreed ta! organize everything necessary; for departure,. but he himself! also took the decision to leave! Britain. “This journey was too danger-! ous for Mrs. Maclean, who was. expecting a baby. 4 “She arrived with her chil- dren in the Soviet Union iret 1953. “As regards Burgess, having: ‘decided to leave Cambridge, he! roffered other posts. Having' agreed to this, he worked at first in one of the departments .of the British secret service, and ‘later in the Foreign Office. Wash. Post and Times Herald Pages 1&9 ae 9h ater . . Bor pet i Santen cnr seat Fy eS ae arny eos rg “Sine “as|;postwar character of Anglo- American policy. é“The. greatest ‘anxiety was! caused ‘by: the fact that at first: no modus vivend] was reached | between East and: West and: later no" attempts were made: to -rezth it. “Neither when he was work- ! ing in the BBC, when he was a Foreign Office official, nor when he was connected ‘with the secret service. or tcounter espionage—M.I, 8—dld he make a secret with ‘his“friends of: colleagues of his.views, or of the fact that he. bad been a Communist, -° 74> a. Spy Charge Reported = “His views at the time he! held the aforementioned posts clearly refute the assertion that he was a Soviet agent.” | “This. explanation of the views of Burgess is necessary to understand the circum- stances which arose a week or so after his return to London from Washington in 1951. | “He visited Maclean as the ‘head of the American Depart- = | ment of the Foreign Office, : “During this mecting they! discovered that their knowledge and appreciation of. the pollti- cal situation and the danger of | war were-identical. ° “The further course of events was determined by the follow-: g circumstances: “Burgess, who already a fe onths previously had sta | oking for other work, intend|: i lo leave the diplomati urd service, was faced with the that the Foreign Office, some-| ‘what later and independently of! Burgess’ decision, had decided; not to employ him any longer ‘in the diplomatic service. + ' “There can be-no doubt that no agent would have left the Foreign Office on his own) initiative. - “However, at the decisive moment, Burgess had doubts as/ to whether he wished or could, do work for which he was striv-: ing, without acting against his own conscience. “For this reason, when Mac: lean told Burgess that he him-: self had decided no longer to) work for the Foreign Office and its policy, and alse proposed, that both of them shovld go to: the U.S. S. R., it was not diffi-, cult for Burgess to agree to this.! “Only there, it seemed to! them, was there a possibility to: ‘put i inte practices i in one form or! another the” convictions which! they had always held. ; “Our life in the Soviet Union has convinced us that we took at that time the correct deci-| dion. : “We are handing. ‘out this statement for publication in the Ir (Sign gned) Donald Maclean, 7? a fan i ee Bea er oe ee