◆ SpookStack

own country, There is no point cy removing a discovered “ source” ig Moscaw, undess it is known gat if is about to be brought to tal, with the risk that further unllis- savered “sourees”’ will be giver away, ; “ Sources.” who are offen unstable sersonalities, i¢énd to suffer from aiuxiely. “Fram time to time they develop “ out-siation” nerves, and homibard Moscow with requests to oc given asylum. Part of the Resi- dent Birector’s job is ta soothe them down, keep theny on the job. A premise is, of course, made to all “sources” that, if they ever are ctected, they and. their families will be saved and taken to Moscow—but only when detection is certain and would lead to. a public s¢aindal In vases where evacuation would be the cause of the scandal, as it vias vill Burgess and Maclean, evacudu- iow would not normally be carripd wm should be added that the busi- hess of arranging an évacuation is vomplex and requires several weeks Wl preparation, Many agents have to be diverted into arranging it; false vassports fave to be made, and every detail carefully organised. The vast of maintaining useless. evacuees 1 Moscow is also unwelcome. In short, however hard he inay bee to be removed to the Soviet Union the “source” will be left in his own country unless ihere is sonte extra+ vdinary reason for removing him. Now, it appears from the White Paper that Burgess and Maclegn ware not in danger of arrest. Tree, ing White Paper says that Maclean was going to be interviewed on sis- picion, and this evidently becarhe kijown to him. Bite~and we must fopk at this through the eyes of the mpn in Moscow who had io decide wicther to evacuate hins—it was not Dy aily means. certain that this inquiry would result in a public scandal. Qn the evidence of the SHO OL White Paper, Maclean was in danger, at }worst, of being called upon to’ resjen. In that event the. British public would have heard nothing af what lay behind. the case. OF course. if ihe British «wuthgri- tie® could have produced concrtte evidence that Maclean had bden communicating secret informatign, th cowld have prosecuted huts: and probably have had him im- prisoned. But, according to the White Paper, no such evidence existed at the time, and this is the fact which would normally weigh most with the Sevict espionage authorities. if Burgess and Maclean were not in the situation which normally walrants evacuation, why did the Soviet authortties take ibis extra- ordinary step? Pacha nd ana WAS ALMORIAALE GAL As itis clear that the evacuation of these mien was fully prepared, and as the oly danger that seems to have confronted them was that eg questioning, it secms likely that te Russians feared they might have iferiminated ofhers if they broke dibwn undér questioning. Both men were admittedly unstable characters, liable ta breakdowns. (Once the Russians had evacuated Maclean they were bound, -in my opinian, to ge on to evacuate his wife: to fave fakea the husband and left his pwife would have had a damaging cffect on Soviet “sources” all over the work.) This supposition need not mean that the Russians fave, or had, a super-spy in the middle of the British Government machine. They might have been mistaken—the battle of Kharkov was lost by the Russians because one of thetr best “sources” in Nazi Germany lad become the dupe of a “double” agent. What seems at least certain is that Moscow not only knew Maclean was going to be questioned itself! remarkable cnough-—but alfo. thought that he aad Burgess might tneriminate others or avoir more important than two expend. able “ sources” such as themselves. 'PHE story of Burgess and Macteun is ons of the most fascinating lof our time. Part of its mterest tas that Maclean was ja many ways a “golden boy” of our com. munity—Liberal family background, |“ progressive’ views, combined lwith an aristocratic demeanour. | Alecr Hiss was fascinating lo Anterica because he seemed ine per- fect specimen of a “ New Dealer”; he, was both attacked and defended | softiotly because of this. Maclgan anti Burgess are to-day being @e- nolinced either as Public, Schgol préducts or as Left-wing ‘inteliec- tuals, Yet Dr. Klaus Fuchs, ghe sbcially colourless. cmiuré, yas : phobably a far more valuable Soviet adent than Maclean or Burgegs. Haw he escaped detection for so long provoked far’ Jess demand for inquiries. 1t seems to be the social, rather than the security, significance of such cases that “here cin be no doubt that some- ' thing has been seriously wrong with our security services. They need thorough imvestigation. Lt wuld not, however, be a sound ideq te i hold that investigation im publiq or int the spirit, of an indignegon meting. | Fuy: and Confusion... | yt AT much of the Press is not i cerely conecried about securypy jg evident enough : one of the papers that most fervently prochiims its patriotic avorries yesterday gave is euess af who was head of our “ Intelligence department” in 1949 —clearly an intended deliberate breach of sccurily. Ever the papers dhat respect security most SCrUpu lously have some odd jdeus on Ue subject “Tf there was suspicion of espionage in his [Burgess 5] case, the evidence should be in the White Paper.” slates The Tintes: 1s that the place for such evidence? The fact that Maxiean was allowed to gel out fof the country shocks the Mu, chester Guardian: but would that paper approve legislation empowcr- ing a secret pole to detain people witheut clear evidence of guilt? The public has every right to know that an inquiry by impartial and implacable men is being made, Parliament sheuld, we believe, press for such a commission. But its find- ‘jnws should remain secret; and if its | members are satisticd, that should be \ enough. Otherwise security must become increasingly breached, To Linerease Parliamentary of mMuMls- lierial watebfulness of our officials, apd public understanding of enginy nfcthods, is a duty: to try to bipak ito our own official sccrets If 4 hlehly irresponsivle form of ener tdinment.