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BTANDARD FORM WO, 64 Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVE {NMENT TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: July ly, 1 ao A MBP FROM ' SAC, WEG ee » SUBJECT: DONALD MACLEAN; aia . GUY BURGESS CC “ ESPIONAGE ~ R w—- _— ‘was interviewed and advised that he hadp) (0 On July 13, 1951, the National Fress Building, Washington, D. C., at which time, BURGESS} .. - - stated that he was interested in questions concerning the Far Haste Meee said that BURGESS later came to his office in the Press Buildihg..—...----. and told him that his, BURGESS’, job at the British imtassy was to analyze the motivations and tendencies of the American attitude. toward the Far East, not only in regard to the official government opinion, but also in regard to the opinicn of the general Americ&in public. Qjggglestated that at this time BUHGESS wanted him to obtain various published materials which would adequately reflect the precise public opinion in the United ‘States with regard to China, ail call from him at the former office of the Foreign Policy Association rn : 7 RUMP acvised that bet»cen January and early March, 1951, BURGESS came to his office a tetal of four or five times for the purpose of discussing the China question, He said that on aJ] but one of these eccasions he took BURGESS to the Fress Club bar where they would drink and talk. @@§QMMy stated tha BURGESS drank heavily but “as able to | "hold his whiskey" in that he could drink six highballs "without turning a hair", He stated that although BURGESS would. drink an unusually large | amount. of whiskey, he never seemed to even approach beconiing intoxicated « aaty MGR acvised that he later met with BURGESS and discussed with | him the course of official American policy toward China and tried to analyze for him the tendencies, im:]ses and concepts of the present Ad- ministration together with the preblems of the Administration in attempting to follow these concepts with so many Republican critics holding different. views. S@@§Be told BURGESS he thought that as time went. on, the critics of the Administration would become more inflvential, but that the over- riding question was the war in kerea, and that political policy depended on battle reports from the Korean freute. QM told BURGESS that it was his opinion that if the Korean war were prolonged, the Urited States would 2 become thoroughly pro-GHIANG KA] ShEX, R@MMMMIN advised that BURGESS had Jater written a report to the Brilish Foreifn office built on the concept that American )ublic opinion with repard to China and the Far East depended upon*battle reports from Korea. r | . a COVItS UN TRV =. : - _ : - ; AL‘ — aA Qoyk? ; \ é-