Reader Ad Slot
Reader Ad Slot placeholder
If you would like to support SpookStack without paying out of pocket, please consider allowing advertising cookies. It helps cover hosting costs and keeps the archive free to browse. You can change this choice at any time.
American Friends Service Committee — Part 28
Page 99
99 / 149
zorces were hmited to two per cent of cach nation’s 1950
population, and each nation's military budger were restricted
to five per cent of the 1950 gross national product, the per-
centages would probably work to the advantage of the United
Scates by fixing the size of its milicary force and budget near
to what it wants and can support, Nations with larger popu-
lations but less national product might be deprived of their
population advantage by inability to suppore a larger army
on its percentage of national product. However, we believe
that careful study can produce a formula which will assure’
genuine armament concrol rather chan national advantage. Ir
is important to bear in mind chart there is a large variecy of
factors applicable to the problem of establishing fair criteria,
Establishing a system of equivalent and balanced reduc-
tion is admittedly difficult. Uniform statistical terms and
processes would have to be developed and applied to all nations,
base years would have co be agreed upon, squabbling over fair
and just quoras might prove disruptive, and deciding what
allowances shauld be made for calonies, allies and satetlires
would be highly complicated. On the other hand, any proposal
less than immediate coral disarmament or flat limirations and
reductions—neither of which appears to be able ta win gen-
eral acceptance—will encounter similar difficulties. If the re-
ductions are so gradual thae major powers remain capable of
waging large-scale war, the importance of equivalences in arms
reduction will remain great. If, however, the cutbacks are
drastic, the problem of equivalences tends to lose some af its
significance and much of its difficulty.
The United States has urged progressive limitation and
balanced reduction of armaments, and has suggested the cri-
teria used in this discussion. However, by proposing, in che
Disarmament Commission om June 28, 1952 specific troop
quotas of 1,/00,000 men for Russia, China, and the Unired
States, 800,000 men for France, 700,000 men for Great Britain,
and smaller forces for other nations, American representatives
indicated a willingness to move toward drastic reduction of
present levels without quibbling about detailed formulae. The
Soviet Union, on the other hand, has urged a flac reduction of
one-third the firsc year, and, to our knowledge, has proposed
no criteria or formula to be followed thereafter. Adoption of
36
our proposal would require greater concessions from the Soviet
Union.
The Proposals Summarized The proposals outlined above
are based on repudiation of rhe
use of weapons of mass destruction, bringing the arms race
to a standstill, establishing inclusive controls, and, as scon as
possible, drastically reducing all military potential. Ie calls for
the following: (1) preparing plans and draft treaties by the
new Disarmament Commission; (2) calling one or more dis-
armament conferences; (3) concluding and ratifying one or
more disarmament treaties; (4) establishing a control organ
within the framework of the Security Council; (3) repudiat-
ing the use of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction,
with the assurance thac the ban will be extended to the pos-
session and manufacture of such weapons, and guaranteeing
that fissionable materials will be used for peaceful purposes
only; (6} establishing strict international control of dangerous
atornic facilities owned by individual nations, and abandoning
the plan for international ownership and management;
{7) adopting a plan for “denaturing” fissionable macerials or
placing them in an international depository so as to render
seizure and use of them for war purposes extremely dificule
and costly, and abandoning the concept of “scrategic balance”;
(#) establishing permanent and continuing inspection of all
armaments, armed forces and military potential and facilities;
(9) permiteing the control organ to make decisions by major-
ity vote, though abandoning the suggestion that the veto be
waived in the Security Council’s deliberations on applying
sanctions; {10} establishing a specific schedule with targee
dates for each stage; (11) progressively limiting and reducing
conventional armaments, facilities and armed forces, using
criteria carefully selected so that in the process no nation or
bloc of nations gains in strategic military advantage.
37
Reveal the original PDF page, then click a word to highlight the OCR text.
Community corrections
No user corrections yet.
Comments
No comments on this document yet.
Bottom Reader Ad Slot
Bottom Reader Ad Slot placeholder
If you would like to support SpookStack without paying out of pocket, please consider allowing advertising cookies. It helps cover hosting costs and keeps the archive free to browse. You can change this choice at any time.
Continue Exploring
Agency Collection
Explore This Archive Cluster
Broad Topic Hub
Topic Hub
federal bureau
letter
Related subtopics
Subtopic
Subtopic
Subtopic
Subtopic
Subtopic