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control. Buc few political issues were in face tackled. Sooner or Jarer some very plain talking about political issues is poing to have wo be done. Non-agreemenc in this arca cannot be allowed to remain the mask behind which contending parties hide when they do noc want to move forward on other issues. The problems of unification or divilon of Korea, with accompanying issues of self-determination, peaceful or violent change, reconstruction, rehabilitation and foreign intermed- dling, cannot forever be created as ghosts—non-existent if you refuse to admit their existence. The position of the Chinese Peoples Republic must also be faced, and uncil faced it will remain 2 persistent international issue. Shall one or both gov- ernments be accredited to the United Nations? Over what territory? Who shall sic on the Security Council, permanently or temporarily? What shall be the relation of Formosa? What reassurances will be demanded against outward aggression or . inward overthrow? What of China's action in Korea? It can- not be too often emphasized that there is no one single solution of these controversies; there can only be continued negotiation with hundreds cf potential alternatives; and out of sincere nego- tiation can emerge a solution which will gain general acceptance. The same must be said for settlement of political issues as . to Japan, Germany, Austria, Africa and the Middle East. And it is becomming more and more widely recognized that each of these problems is more aggravated as it becomes linked to mili- tary policy—to NATO, co strategic bases, to rearming Ger- many and Japan and the nations of Eastern Europe. The posi- tion of many, until recently, has been that these issues muse be settled before disarmament and like action could be atcempted. aie a . . ra Py 5 Bur at Paris in 1951-$2 there began to develop a somewhat more realistic attitude—realistic in recognizing how armaments complicate the issues—that none of these settlements, with che possible exception of Korea, need or should precede coming to agreement on disarmament. Whichever way we turn, we are aware that the major problems facing the United Nations are bound up with and rendered more insoluble by armaments. It is tor this as well as for religious and moral reasons thac we believe mankind's next step is to disarm, and that the time for disarmament co begin is NOW. END 48 Ki3a ARMED STRENGTH AND EXPENDITURES GF NATO COUNTRIES* . I95O0-5tDetense Militury Expenditure Personnal Cia millioned UNITED KINGDOM [Or rr rn ace seme re ~~ las, i “eae Rarer ees “ss aos my gor 650 BENELUX eee | - 4.207000 404 PORTUGAL ante 7 7 62,000 fezay 90,000 46 NORWAY a 16,000 32,000 72 DENMARK . ty ; 18,000 ae “227 000 44 ARMED FORCES OF EASTERN EUROPE ** SOVIET UNION - ines en Mia ae ee RUMANIA POLAND CZECHOSLOVAKIA pai | HUNGARY =g BULGARIA <7 * From Mutwal Secwrity Act af 1951, Report of the Com on Acmed Servicer on H. RK. $113, August 27, 151. ** From Jsumet Strength and Weaknew: The Sazellre Contribution,” April (951, p. 171. ° **" From Busic Informetion ow Implementation of Com. B the North Atlantic Treat H yeti Relations, U. 5. Senate, February tf, 4953. Fray, muvee on Fortin 4,009,060 2 ¥* Ed unites on Foregn Relacivar and the Comattiee