◆ SpookStack

ne RARE EI Se re EE Re oe Net RE ee NE Tien a eee net ene eR er rere Moe Tt ee vet pliers + : . ‘ An official U.S. memorandum titled Status of Refugee Program states in part: “In 1968 with the increase of military activity in the more densely settled areas, new refugees should number 600,000 with about 300,000 being t re-established during the same period.* a = The U.S. authorities not only acknowledge the essential connection between “military activity" and rising estimates of “new refugees"; they also plan to ex- ploit the misery of the refugees to gain support for the South Vietnamese government — in whose behzlf our armed forces are creating the refugees in the first place. The above memorandum states: “Refugees by virtue of their numbers, their recognizable identity as a disadvantagec and compassionate group, and most impor- . - Heanw a Wiener <== tantly their family and the village connections in contested and Viet Cong areas, present # singular and readily exploitable opportunity to increase popular support of the Government of Vietnam within Vietnam and abroad." (Emphasis supplied) Thus even the humanitarian impulses of those who feel pity for the refugees are included in the calculations of the U.S. authorities who are responsible for carrying out the war programs in Vietnam. First they destroy villages. Then they encourage compassionate concern for the refugees from the destroyed villages, Then they use the works of compassion as evidence of the fine qualities of the Govern- ment of Vietnam and in this way they seek to justify destroying more villages to keep this government in power. The truth is that genuine humanitarian purposes can- not be fulfilled until the U.S. military activities in Vietnam are ended, and no humanitarian programs connected with the military activities are truly humanitarian unless they serve to bring the war to a halt rather than justify its continuation. TII. Political life in South Vietnam has but two dimensions: the massive military intervention of the United States and the seeming inexhaustible capacity of the NLF to continue effective resistance. oe With the recent election of the military junta ‘and the swift crushing of those who charged that the election was rigged, the doom of any likely independent “non- Front" political activity in South Vietnam was sealed. Rumors and reports of jails bulging with political prisoners in South Vietnam, and of intensive interrogations accompanied by torture as a matter of routine are Widespread. At the same time students and others who have been engaged vigorously in non-Communist struggle movement activities against the Saigon regime say that many of their number are coming to the conclusion that the NLF is the only alterna- tive to the ‘corrupt, foreign dominated, militaristic Saigon government. They say that many already have joined the Front and more yet.are giving it serious considera- tion. They say that the Front is growing in strength. They say that U.S. policy in South Vietnam is creating Communists. _ ; -. ’ . * The basic desire of most Vietnamese is for peace. All Vietnamese except the top leadership group have an enormous stake in peace; without it they cannot survive as Vietnamese. Only the leadership group around Thieu and Ky has a compelling stake in blocking peace moves. Most of them have a clear and unblemished record of fight- mn alannentian Faun? ee Pee ee PTFE ee eee ing alongside foreign powers against Vietnamese nationalists. First it was the French; now it is the Americans, ;