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POSSIBILITIES FOR A SETTLEMENT ' 69 and Da Nang appear to them to be of a larger and more permanent kind than required by the present war in Vietnam. It is important, therefore, that while we ask for negotiations we also announce immediate steps of de-escalation such as the cessation of bombing in both North and South and a freeze on further troop build-up. Further steps could include refraining from provocative tactics such as patrols in force, unprovoked attacks, and efforts to expand the areas of occupation, Any proncuncement by the United States must also affirm that the future of Vietnam should be decided by the Vietnamese them- selves. At the same time, the United States should make clear that it is willing to sign and support such agreements as may be developed guaranteeing a settlement. This assurance could erase doubts stemming from the refusal of the United States to endorse the 1954 Geneva Accords. Pham Van Dong, premier of North Vietnam, has insisted on the importance of full United States participation in any agreement.” The pronouncement should make clear that the National Liberation Front would be included in any negotiations and in anv political settlement in South Victnam as a party in its own right and not an appendage of the Hanoi delegation. Such a deciaration would probably open the way for desirable changes in the present political situation in Saigon. No one can foretell what might emerge in terms of local political forces. But it is possible that the nonmilitary elements that paved the way for the overthrow of the Diem regime and that have since been suppressed would re-emerge and could help speed the process of reaching a settlement. Two unilateral steps then constitute the sine qua non for nego- tiations, Variants as to order of announcement or extent of action may be necessary; but before any serious negotiating is possible, the United States needs to make clear first that it docs not plan to continue its military involvement and is starting on immediate steps of de-escalation and. second, that the Vietnamese, including the National Liberation Front, must decide their own fate. It is . often said that by making unilatere! moves the United States is giving up bargaining counters or even “blue chips” as if the Viet- namese situation were part of a complicated game. Our goal, | 7 William Warbey, MP, New Yurk Tinies, November 28, 1963.