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NEED FOR SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 21 However, in facing this problem, just as in facing the question ° of nationalism in Southeast Asia, the United States government has consistently guided its activities with an overriding concern to “stop Communism.” In order to deal with the demands for socioeconomic revolution and also contain Communism, Wash- ington has evolved a two-pronged approach: economic assistance and military assistance with special emphasis on counterinsurgency programs. This approach is based in part on theories of economic growth propounded by Walt W. Rostow, now chairman of the State Department Policy Planning Council. According to Mr. Rostow, there are several stages in the transition from the tradi- tional agrarian economy to modern industrialism with its high mass consumption. At the beginning this transition is a slow process requiring the accumulation of vast amounts of capital. When suffi- cient capital has been accumulated or poured into the country from the outside, its economy reaches a take-off stage. At this point the various elements of the economy—capital accumulation, entrepreneurial drives, labor skills, technolopgy—all accelerate rapidly, thus leading to a stage of self-sustaining growth. Then the country is well on its way toward the development of a modern industrial society. The countries of eastern and southern Asia encompassed in the vast crescent arch extending from Korea to Pakistan, with the exceptions of Japan, Singapore, and probably Taiwan, are all still in the pre-take-off stage, or just beginning to enter it. In the view of Rostow and other foreign policy planners in Washington, this is a period fraught with danger, since needs and desires tend to outrun the capacity to satisfy them, and the resulting discontent leads to political instability. It is at this point that Communism has its opportunity to gain ascendancy. There- fore, as we pour capital and technical assistance into these coun- tries in order to speed up the process of economic modernization, we also help friendly governments develop counterinsurgency pro- grams on a large scale. By so doing, it is hoped that stability can be maintained through the take-off stage, usually a period of a decade or two, and that the Communists will be thwarted in their attempt to gain power during the intervening period. - Our two-pronged approach of economic assistance and counter-