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Ali Hasan Al Majid Al Tikriti Chemical Ali — Part 1
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Continuation of FD-3020f ____ Ali Hasan Al-Majid Al-Tikriti ,On_01/31/2004 __ , Page
in government service: during the past ten ‘years, though not as a
volunteer. .
MAJID stated that during this time he was appointed to
three different Ministerial posts without first being asked or
notified. He learned of these appointments from radio and
television announcements. Concerning his most, recent appointment
as Minister of Interior, MAJID heard that Hussein was reluctant to
ask. MAJID to serve in this capacity for fear ‘that MAJID would
refuse and thereby embarrass Hussein.
Before the 2001 Ba'ath Conference, MAJID asked Hussein
whether he would continue as a Party member. MAJID simply wanted.
out of the Ba'ath. Hussein denied this request. In more recent
times, Hussein told MAJID that he could terminate his membership in
the Party at the 2004 Conference. MAJID described thé day he heard
this news as "the happiest day of my life."
During the last seven to eight years, Hussein refused to
accept advice or criticism from his closest advisors even if he was
wrong. After Hussein Khamil, Hussein's son-in-law, fled Iraq to
Jordan in 1995, Hussein did not.trust anyone and appeared to change
for the worse. ‘He seemed particularly wary of individuals who were
‘respected in the Party.
MAJID describéd his feelings and those of others
regarding issties leading the latest war with the United States.
MAJID wanted the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)
inspectors to visit Iraq in 2003, as did the majority of the Ba'ath
leadership. They felt the boycott would not be ended without
certification of the termination of Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) program. Hussein, however, did not agree that
the inspectors should bé allowed to enter Iraq. Thus, MAJID and -
the other leaders had to support Hussein. If not, they would have
been viewed as traitors and on the side of the United States.
During this period, Hussein, Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri, Taha
Ramadan, Tariq Aziz, and MAJID held a discussion regarding WMD.
The four men "pressed" Husséin to. tell UNSCOM and the world that
Iraq has no WMD. Hussein did not agree stating that Israel would
strike Iraq if they felt’ Iraq had no WMD. At this meeting, MAJID
- asked Hussein, "Do we have WMD?" Hussein asked, "Don't you know?"
MAJID stated "no" to which Hussein “replied mo."
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