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42. (Continued); memorandum to the DD/R assis ning them 16. At the Special Group Meeting on 20 September, iam was discussed. After its use over Kamchatka was disapproved General Carter urged its possible use against Cuba and State appeared enthusiastic. Based upon this, General Carter dispatched an action i responsibility "within CLA fem also CIA responsi- 2 Per Sern? otier aerial recommaissance operations against Cuban targets and for presentation of these CLA operations to the Special Group (Augmented) after appropriate Agency and Community coordination, " 17. During this period, poor weather resulted in no exploitable take from U~-2 operations. The Agency had made an operational determination that none of the four flights which evolved from the 10 September meeting would be made unless weather along the flight routes was less than 25% overcast. The first of the four flights was made on 26 September; the last on 7 October. The peripheral flights turned up additional SAM sites and coastal defense cruise-missile sites, but-that is about all. 18. Conclusions of the Cuban SNIE, approved by USIB on 19 September, were cabled to you that day. While the SNIE stated that the Soviets might be tempted to establish other weapons ofa more "offensive" character, such as additional typés of short-range surface-to-surface missiles, ané that the Soviet Union could derive considerable advantage from the establishment of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, the estimate concluded: ", | It would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the Soviet Union has displayed thus far, and consequently would have important policy implications with respect to other areas and other problems in East- West relations. " 43