◆ SpookStack

6. (Continued) —_me < Pitt i The Attorney General queried the meeting as to what other aggres- sive steps could be taken, questioning the feasibility of provoking an action against Guantanamo which would permit us to retaliate, or involving 2 third country in some way. It was Mr. Bundy's opinion that all overt actions would involve serious consequences throughout the world and therefore our operations must be covert at this time, although we should expect a high degree of attribution. The meeting was inconclusive with respect to any particular course ef action. It was felt that the President should be informed on the evolving situation and the DCI agreed to brief him at the Meeting on Wednesday, August 22nd at 6 o'clock, We further agreed that the entire matter should be reviewed with the Fresident by Rusk, McNamara, Bundy and McCone. Mr. Bundy undertook to arrange for this meeting following the Special Meeting scheduled for ten o'clock on Thursday, August 23rd. Following this discussion, there was a brief discussion of the Donovan matter as covered in DCI's memorandum to Rusk and the Attorney General, copy of which is attached. It was agreed that Mr. Hurwitz would meet with Mr. Donovan on Thursday, together with the Attorney General, and determine the extent of the commitment we would make for the govern- ment which would permit Mr. Donovan to engage in the prisoner release negotiations. DCI made it abundantly clear that the existing commitments to Committees of the Congress prevented CIA from using covert resources for this purpose. McCone stated that in view of these commitments to the Congress he did not feel that he should meet with Mr. Donovan, Furthermore, that McCone stated that he felt that if a reasonable deal could be made for the release of the prisoners, the Committees of Congress would change the view expressed a year ago at the time of the tractor negotiation, Reverse Blank 23