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4. (Continued) For SttreT our policy az reported in the preas might be ' extremely difficult and involve unacceptable dangers, I would like to talk with you on from Norstad's headquarters to the White Hous or Pentagon situation room tonight {13 Sept.) between 1700 and 1800 your time. Unless I hear to the contrary from you by twelve noon today your time I will proceed Paris this evening and make arrangements for this call," 10. On September léth McCone cabled Carter as follows: "Alao believe we must carefully study the prospect of secret importation and placement of several Soviet MRBMs which could not be detected by us if Cuban defenses deny overflight. In reflecting on my observations of Thor installation in Britain and Jupiters in Italy I can envisage a Soviet plan to package missile, control and operating equipment in such a way that a unit could be made operational a few hours after a site cleared and a modest concrete pad poured. Do not wish to be overly alarming this matter but believe CIA and community | must ksep government informed of danger of 2 | surprise and also that detection of preparatory steps | possibly beyond our capsbility once Cuban defense system operative. Thrust of press reports reaching | me is that there exists a clear demarcation between 1 defensive and cffensive preparations and I question i we can be sure of this, I recognise Cuban policy decisions most delicate and beyond Agency or my competence, However belisve we must give those making decisian our best estimate of possible developmenta and alternative situations which might evolve and unexpectedly confront us. . On 19 September Carter communicated the summary of the econclusians of Cuban SNIEZ of that date, paragraph D stating that in the opinion of the BNE, eatablishment of MRBMs in Cuba would be -3- TOP-SECRET 15