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112. ‘Continued: CONCLUSIONS L Although the intelligence community's inquiry into its actions during the Cuban crisis revealed certain areas where shortcomings exiated and where improvements should be made in various areas of intelligenca collection and process- ing, the intelligence community cperated extensively and well in connection with Cuba. Every major weapons system Intro- duced into Cuba by the Soviets was detected, identified, and reported (with respect to numbera, location and operational characteristics) before any ons of thess systems attained an operational capability. 2. A relatively short period of time ensued between the introduction of strategic weapons into Cuba, particularly strategic missiles, and the commencement of the flow, although meager, of tangible reports of their presence; detection of their possible presence and targeting of the suspect areas of their location was accomplished in 2 compressad time frame; and the intelligence cycle did move with extraordinary rapidity through the stagea of collection, analysis, targeting for veri- fication, and positive identification. 3. The very substantial effort directed toward Cuba was originated by an earlier concern with the situation in Cuba and the effort, already well under way, contributed to the detection and analysis of the Soviet build-up. 4. Information was disseminated and used. 5. Aerial photography was very effective and our best means of establishing hard intelligence. 6. The procedures adopted in September delayed : photographic intelligence, but this delay was not critical, because photography obtained prior te about 17 October would not Lave been sufficient to warrant action of a type which would require support from Western Hemisphere NATO allies, _ 375