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3. (Continued) THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA’ THE PROBLEM To analyze the situation in Cuba and to estimate the pros- pects over the next year or so, with particular reference to Castro’s relations with the Communists and to the potential for resistance to his regime. CONCLUSIONS A. Fidel Castro has asserted his primacy in Cuban commu- nism; the “old” Communists have had to accommodate them- selves to this fact, as has the USSR. Further strains may develop in these relationships, but they are unlikely to break the ties of mutual interest between Castro and the “old” Com- munists and between Cuba and the USSR. (Paras. 1-10) B. By force of circumstances, the USSR is becoming ever more deeply committed to preserve and strengthen the Castro regime. The USSR, however, has avoided any formal com- mitment to protect and defend the regime in all contin- gencies, (Para, 11) at C. The Cuban armed forces are loyal to the personal lead- ership of the Castro brothers. Their capabilities have been and are being greatly enhanced by the Soviet Bloc’s provi- sion of military equipment and instruction. Cuban military capabilities, however, are essentially defensive. We believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with the capa- bility to undertake major independent military operations ‘This estimate is designed to bring up-to-date NIE 85-62, “The Situation and Prospects in Cuba,” dated 21 March 1962. The background informa- tion contained in that document remains generally valid.