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CubanMissileCrisisCIA

354 pages · May 08, 2026 · Document date: Sep 16, 1992 · Broad topic: General · Topic: Cubanmissilecrisiscia · 354 pages OCR'd
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84. (Continued) 3. Chairman Vinson stated that he thought the speech was good. He approved it but he had concluded that military action would be necessary and this he heartily approved. Vinson feels that we must dispose of the Castro problem as well as the missiles. In this regard, I outlined my feelings as covered by separate memorandum. Vinson tended to review the activities of the Navy with Admiral Anderson and others, insisting that we must be sure that we are going to do enough, that our blockade is going to be effective, and that if we invade, we must invade with great force, an assured victory, quick victory, otherwise Cuban resistance will be rallied and our casualties will be great. He stated that 250,000 men would Re not enough, that it would take 500, 000 men; that we should land/at least 10 or more points in Cuba at one time, and if we did this, the entire Cuban population would come to our side, Note: Both Vinson and Russell were very inquisitive as to the position of the Joint Chiefs. I explained this as expressed by Taylor, pointing out that their position of a sudden unannounced military strike was reasonable in view of their responsibilities, however, it must also be recognized that civilians with broader responsibilities, i.e. military and political as well, necessarily had to moderate the JCS view. I stated that I felt the JCS view would insure the most successful military operations with the least American losses but that I opposed it and felt that the military handicaps resulting from our course of action {in military operations) must be reverted to, can be overcome by increase in the weight of the military operation. None of the three felt that we should have undertaken a surprise attack; however, Russell in particular felt that a warning and a following military operation might have been preferable to the blockade. I pointed out that the warning now had been given and action could be taken now "at a time of our own choosing and by means of our own determination" and after again reviewing the wording of the speech, Russell agreed this was correct. JOHN A. MC CONE
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