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48. Cline, Memorandum for the Record, “Notification of NSC Officials of Intelligence on Missile Bases in Cuba,” 27 October 1962 27 October 1962 *=O2SNDUU TGR THE RECORD SUBIECP: Netificaticn of MSC Officials of Intelligence on Uissile Bases in Cuba 1. St absut 2100 on the evening of 25 Cotober the President called ze on the thone at a dinner varity I wes attending at the avartzcent of tos. Anne Chennault, wider of the late General, at L101 Cathedral Avenue. Ze said he had reard stories that Cia officers were allegirg that intelli- gence on offensive missile bases in Cuba had deen available for several days before it was called to the attention of the President. He asked ne to confirm that I was responsible for the analysis of this kind of intelligence and appropriate dissemination of it to higher authorities, and to tell him the facts in the case. 2. I told the President that I was responsible in CIA for substan- tive analysis of intelligence and the dissemination of current intelligence to the President and the Hational Security Council. I said I could state categorically that the stories he had heard were untrue, since I was sure the mission with the first photography of the HMRBM offensive bases was flovm on lh October and it took approximately 2) hours for the film to be returned, processed, delivered to the National Photographic Interpreta- tion Center and scanned by PI analysts. I said I was sure the technical analysis did not turn ub the evidence until late afternoon or early evening of 15 Octoder, that I myself heard of it first at that time, and that we coepleted the analysis defore passing the information formally to the “nite Youse on tie morning of 16 October. The President seemed content with this explanation. 3. In view of concern over this period of intelligence handling of this sensitive information, I have tried to reconstruct what I know of the events of the evening of 15 October and morning of 16 October, as follows. h. lnder direct orders fra the President, given to me and General at the Wiite Fouse several weeks earlier ahen the cossibility that o } instructions to the Director, NPIC, to see that intelligence on new offensive weacons in Cvba cere to me as socn as analysis had identified the type of absolutely no dissecinatien of this intelligence should be rade without = approval. 15 Octcber I spent all atternocn at the sessicen of the th-US Intelligence Metheds Conference. 149