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Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDP96-00788R000100330001-5 KILLING FOR THE GOLD...Continued by units of the Bundeswehr under the control of Bruno Merk, Bavarian interior minister, and the Federal Border Police, under the command of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Federal interior minister. The ultimate failure of these units to success- fully free the hostages rests on the fact that no single. individual.commanded and, rather than the typical German penchant for organization, disorganization characte- rized the remainder of the operation. By late afternoon, the German author- ities had decided that the terrorists would not be allowed to leave Germay with their hostages. The terrorists requested trans- portation for themselves and the hostages from the Olympic Village to the Munich airport, where a waiting jet would carry them to Cairo. The Germans granted the terrorist request, then began preparing an ambush for the terrorists. During the day, intelligence reported that five terrorists had carried out the attack. Using this information, the. Ger- mans came up with a final plan they in- tended to implement. A bus would enter the Olympic Village and transport the ter- rorists and hostages to a field adjoining the village, where they would board two Bun- deswehr choppers and be transported not to Munich airport, but rather to Fursten- feldbruck Airbase, some 20 miles outside Munich. At Furstenfeldbruck, a Luftwaffe base, a Lufthansa 727 sat waiting. Unknown to the terrorists, the 727 held no crew, for the Germans did not intend to allow them to board the jet alive. Atop the tower at Furstenfeldbruck, three German Border Police sharpshoo- ters had taken up positions. Two addition- al marksmen were positioned on the air- field itself, Within 50 meters of the snipers’ positions, the choppers holding the terror- ists and hostages would land, According to the plan, the terrorists would be shot as soon as they exited the choppers and made their way to the waiting 727. The sharpshooters were armed with bolt-action sniping rifles equipped with telescopic sights. Maximum range to their intended targets would not exceed 40 meters. However, by the time prepara- tions had been made, darkness had fallen on the airbase, and the killing ground was crisscrossed by eerie and confusing sha- dows caused by the spotlights illuminating the area. At the last minute, Bundeswehr officials offered the use of semiauto rifles equip- ped with infrared sighting devices. However, the police marksmen were not trained in their use, and turned down the offer. The stage had been set for the final option. At 2235 hrs., three choppers approached Furstenfeldbruck and land- ed. Two held the terrorists and hostages, while the third contained police and nego- tiators. By this time it was learned that the original intelligence was in error. Eight ter- rorists guarded the hostages — not five. This placed the police sharpshooters in-a no-win situation, asit is tactically and prac- tically impossible to simultaneously kill eight terrorists with five bullets. In the in- terim between firing the initial volley and reloading, something was bound to go wrong. Four terrorists exited the choppers. Two approached the waiting 727, and two held the chopper pilots as shields. Satisfied with the 727, the two terrorists began walking back to the chopper. At this point the fire command was given to the sharpshooters. Inexplicably, only one round reverberated around the tense air- base, quickly followed by four more. Two terrorists went down for the count in the initial volley, with the remaining six returning police fire. The nine hostages, still within the chopper and mute to the horror that surrounded them, were gun- ned down where they sat. A terrorist tos- sed a fragmentation grenade among the contorted bodies in the chopper for good measure. At the end of an hour-long fire fight, three additional terrorists were kil- led, and three eventually surrendered. The Munich Massacre had become real- ity. The following scenario shows one possible replaying of the Munich tragedy. Los Angeles, July 1984: The catering truck pulled up to the Olympic Village entrance on the Westwood campus of UCLA (University of California, Los Angeles). At 0600 hrs., the caterers were running an hour behind their routine schedule for the 0700 breakfast serving. As the truck stopped at the barricade, the uniformed policeman on duty heaved his middle-aged bulk from the chair in the guard-shack and approached the open window of the van. The day promised to be a beauty. The early-morning fog normal for this time of year, hanging heavy and oppressive from Santa Monica to downtown, was missing — a warm Santa Ana wind had blown in overnight from the Mojave, replacing low clouds with brillant stars. As the guard reached for the caterer’s extended I.D. card, a bleating BMW hom on nearby Freeway 405 distracted his attention: Six 9mm slugs chewed their way through his thin uniform shirt and buried themselves in his chest. As the policeman slid to the pavement, the cater- ing truck bolted through the barricade and roared into the Olympic Village, making directly for the apartments of the Turkish team. Jumping the sidewalk, the catering SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984 truck screeched to a halt beside the fire exit of the high-rise apartment building. The door to the building was locked, buta well-placed burst from the suppressed MAC-10 quickly gained them entrance. A startled security agent in the building corridor reached instictively for the hol- stered Beretta 92 under his jacket. Unfor- tunately, his effort was rewarded with another burst from the furious Ingram. Five men entered the corridor behind the submachine-gun-wielding point man. ‘Moving instantly to the pre-planned target, the point man took up a position beside the door of the Turkish suite, as a second man moved into position in front of the door. The point man squatted, wait- ing for the door-breaker to employ the cutdown 870 loaded with #000 Buck on the twin door hinges. At this point, the blast of the shotgun charges mattered lit- tle. As the door slid from the wall, the two men rushed in, quickly followed by their four comrades. The six-man Turkish team was rounded up from their beds in moments. The Armenian terrorist team had accom- plished their first objective. AtO608 hrs., a telephone call to the Olympic security building assured the officials that the Turks were being held hostage for crimes committed against Armenia in 1917. As in Munich, preparations have been made to ensure the security of the L.A. Olympiad. But unlike Munich, the 84 Games will be spread over an immense area of Southern Califormia, reaching over 200 miles from Santa Barbara to San Diego. Security will be provided by an army of uniformed and plainclothes police, in excess of 17,000 individuals, comprising over 100 different and over- lapping jurisdictions. Once again the question is asked, “Who is in charge?” At the present time, Olympic security is being coordinated by the Los Angeles Police Department, under its chief, Daryl F. Gates. Actual day-to-day responsibility has been passed on to Commander Wil- liam Rathbum. The Olympic Committee has also hired a former FBI agent as its security coordinator, Edgar Best. On top ore is William Webster, Director of the Webster and Gates have been trying for quite some time to overcome the problem of decentralized leadership. In a Los Angeles Times article (6 January 1984), Webster said that he ‘... had no doubt that the FBI and the LAPD will resolve their differences over which agency will take the lead in responding to any terror- ism within the city [read: LAPD's jurisdic- tion] during the Olympics.” Both Webster and Gates have pledged to work together CONTINUED NEXT PAGE Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDP96-00788R000100330004-5