◆ SpookStack

While there was no clear discussion of the opinion of the Joint Chiefs as to the relative merits of the two plans, I think these two statements are correct: 1) that there was no impression left that the Joint Chiefs as such preferred the Zapata [Trinidad?] plan; 2) it was clearly understood that they had approved the {Zapata] plan and favored the operation on this revised basis. I base this statement upon the fact that the President repeatedly asked for the opinion of representatives of the Defense Department, including members of the Joint Chiefs, and was invariably informed that the Defense Department favored the opera- tion. I do not think that this was merely a matter of "concurrence by attendance." The military certainly wanted the operation to proceed; I do not think that this was because of a deep conviction that this was the best possibleplan--it was rather that in view of the absence of desirable al- ternatives and the press of time, the military believed that the prospects were sUfficiently favorable so that it would be best to go ahead. I would not wish to go further into detailed analysis of the motives or positions taken by the Joint Chie;fs. 60/* * By the time that Bundy appeared before the CSG as a witness, he already was on record with a memorandum specifying "that the causes of failure of this operation are essentially military, and only secondarily political, though the consequences are almost all political and only slightly military." 60al Bundy made quite clear his view that the military were responsible for pushing the senior political advisers into supporting the invasion effort. Arthur Schlessinger also was on record with his views on the military vs political views of the anti-Castro effort. Inunediately following the President·s rejection of the Trinidad plan, Schlesinger wrote: The trouble with the operation ~s that the less the mili- tary risk, the greater the political risk, and vice versa. It seems to me that the utilization of the men under con- ditions of minimum political risk is clearly the thing to aim at. I bad the impression Ire the presentation of the Trinidad pla~] that the military aspects of the problem had received more thoughtful attention than the political aspects. 60bl . considering that the operation called for an amphibious landing one. would hope that the principal concern of the planners would have been for success in the field, without reference to domestic politics. 7 0 lZ