◆ SpookStack

." and Rip Robertson--would have reinforced the point that without air cover all hope for success was gone.* Before the fourth meeting closed Mr. Bissell offered his opinions..:on some of the "wrong judgments" that had been made. Included in this category were the underestimations of Castro's organizational ability, particularly the ability to move his forces into operation within the minimum estimated time period; an underestimation of Castro's air capability, with the re- iteration that "contrary to our opinion the T-33s were armed;" the failure to give proper emphasis to success as opposed to deniability; and, with reference to air operations, an in- sufficient number of B-26s and B-26 pilots, the failure to acquire US air bases, and the failure to use US pilots. In his apologia, Bissell overlooked the basic fact that even with the best of pilots and more aircraft, there was no way B-26s could compete in the air with T-33s or Sea Furies. Bissell also noted that another "major mistake was the restriction on the employment of our air capability between D-2 and D-Day." * Based on testi~ony of Bissell and Cabell, the discussions with SecretarY of State Rusk were concluded by approximately 10:30 p.m. (Washington and Cuba time). Departure of Gray Lynch and the UDT team of Cubans to mark Blue Beach did not begin until approximately 1:00. a.m. (Cuban and Washington Time) on 17 April 1961. Within that two to two and a half hour time frame, a cancellation message could have been sent from Washington to the vessels standing off Cuba. 56 'I