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That the Cubans should exercise a large responsibility. I emphasize that because one of the changes thatoccurred--never really noted in any policy paper but an important change in the concept that occurred progressively in the next four or five months--was that we found it less and less possible to rely on the Cubans for competent and effective action. And to an increasing degree over the next five or six months, this political entity came to be served as a cover and a threat rather than as itself in its own right a vitaldecisiotl,making and an executive organization.J.I The question of the change in concept for the planned operation also was raised during the course of the first meeting and it, too, would be the subject of ongoing discussions. The reasons fOr the reservations which General Taylor had about accepting the job also became apparent during the course of the first meeting of the CSG. Both Jake Esterline of the CIA and Admiral Arleigh Burke made references to the political interference which had a significant impact on the military operation. The almost instantaneous, knee~jerk reaction of Robert Kennedy to any such suggestions showed loud and clear i.n the verba.tim transcript1 but, unfortunately, in the official memorandum of the meeting, none of this comes through. lllustrative of the readiness of the Attorney General to defend bi.s br.other was the following exchange between Jake Esterline and Kennedy. Esterline said: There certainly are some other things that Col. Hawkins and I feel very strongly about and I think it is pre- mature to mention them and yet I think