◆ SpookStack

g. The operation suffered from being run from the distance of Washington. At that range and with the limited reporting which was inevitable on the part of field commanders absorbed in combat, it was not possible to have a clear understanding in Washington of events taking place in the field. This was particularly the case of the night of D-plus-l when an appreciation of the ammunition situation would have resulted in an all- out effort to supply the beach by all available means. h. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had the important responsibility of examining into the military feasibility of this operation. They approved the ZAPATA Plan, although initially they would have preferred TRINIDAD, a point which apparently never reached the senior civilian officials. As a body they reviewed the successive changes of the Plan piece-meal and only within a limited context, a procedure which was inadequate for a proper examination of all the military ramifications. Individually, they had differing understandings of important features of the operation. i. Although the intelligence was not perfect, particularly the evaluation of the effectiveness of the T-33s, we do not feel that any failure of intelligence contributed significantly to the defeat. 2~O '~. .- rr ~ , 1 I,