◆ SpookStack

believe that under the conditions which developed the beachhead could not have survived long without substantial help from the Cuban population or without overt u.s. assistance. As noted above, the guerrilla alternative did not really exist •• 13. Our conclusions are still tentative as we have not yet discussed the operation with'the President or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the moment we would advance the following: a. A paramilitary operation of the magnitude of ZAPATA fell outside the limited scope of NSC 5412/2 and exceeded the organizational capacity of the CIA. Responsibility for the planning, training, and execution of the operation should have been trans- ferred to the Department of Defense about N~vember, 1960, and the covert classification of the operation r~-~xamined. If the transfer of the operation in the form contemplated was not approved, it should have been abandoned. b. Once the need for the operation was established, its success should have had the primary consideration of all agencies in the Government. Operational restrictions designed to protect its covert character shOUld have been accepted only if they did not impair the chance of success. As it was, the leaders of the operation were obliged to fit their plan inside changing ground rules laid down for non- military considerations, which often had serious operational disadvantages. 267