◆ SpookStack

/ I recommended in writing that the operation be abandoned if sufficient air support was not to be provided and predicted military disaster if opposing air forces were not completely neutralized before the beach assault. This still could have been accom- plished, even with the reduced air sorties allowed to be planned, had it not been for cancellation at the last moment of the air strikes scheduled against any remaining enemy aircraft at dawn on D-Day. This was the final disaster, preventing as it did the orderly landing of all troops and their supplies. In conclusion, let me say that the operation came closer to succeeding than the American people have ever been allowed to know. The objective was to ignite the spark of counter- revolution throughout Cuba, not to send a small body of armed patriots marching from the Bahia de Cochinos into the streets of Havana. If that small body of patriots had been protected sufficiently to allow them to bring in their ships safely and land their ammunition and supplies, they could possibly have held on long enough to ignite the spark. Was it not significant that the Cuban Navy made no effort to interfere and that captured militiamen and civilians in the objective area offered to join the invading force? This sort of response possibly would have been magni- fied many times if the landing had been made at Trinidad as recommended by the CIA but disapproved for reasons hard to understand. Trinidad was in better guerrilla country (Escambray Mountains), had better landing facilities, more civilians to recruit, and guerrilla forces already active in the area, plus a suitable airfield. No, the failure of the Cuban patriots was not the fault of the CIA. Too bad that it has had to bear the brunt of the criticism. 14/ 248