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te~timony of various individuals. Unfortunately this procedure made it impossible--or apparently impossible since no witnesses were recalled--to resolve differences among the testimony of witnesses or discrepancies between testimony and documents, including the Annexes. Inasmuch as most of the documents that the CSG requested were available prior to the committee's first session--only a few documents of a statistical nature were prepared specifically in response to the DSG's requests-- it was unfortunate that the committee did not first attempt to collect and review pertinent materials before examining witnesses. As a result of the committee's failure to resolve these kinds of discrepancies, such critical issues as the following were ignored: 1. Claims by Secretary Rusk and others with reference to the cancellation of the D-Day air strike that President Kennedy was unaware that the Zapata plan called for both a D minus 2 and a D-Day strike. Not only was there ample eVidence that McGeorge Bundy, the President's National Security Adviser, was an early advocate of a pre-D-Day strike, but the "Summary of White House Meetings" that General David Gray pre- ared for the committee noted that during a 6 April 1961 meeting-- after Mr. Bissell had specified that there would be a D minus 2 strike: "The President questions whether or not a preliminary strike wasn't an alarm bell. "* 2. The Committee's complete lack of concern about the handling of JCSM-44-61 and JCSM-166-61. Both reports were lost, forgotten, or ignored by Secretary McNamara. The papers rep- resented the thinking of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and could have had a direct impact on the operational plan had they been properly evaluated. JCSM-44-61 proposed that an interdepartmental group plan Castro's ouster with the US military playing a leading role, and JCSM-166-61 specified that CIA's Trinidad plan was better than any proposed alternatives, including Zapata. *General Gray's memorandum was dated 9 May 1961. 239