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other members of the Joint Chiefs, General Lemnitzer was of the opinion that they had done all that could have been expected from them in the way of advising the President. Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, was the sole witness at the eighteenth meeting of the Cuban Study Group on 19 May 1961. Once again a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was asked to comment on the Secretary of Defense's reaction to JCSM-44-6l (27 January 1961) on proposed US action in Cuba. Again a member of the Joint Chiefs told the CSG that the memorandum had gone forward to Mr. McNamara, but that nothing further was heard from it. Yet another time, the committee chose not to pursue the matter further. As with the other Chiefs, Admiral Burke stated that the only difference between Trinidad and Zapata insofar as the air strikes were concerned was that by using the Zapata strip the cl~im could be made that the air attacks were originating from within Cuba. In response to the question of whether or not the Joint Chiefs approved of the Zapata plan, Admiral Burke volunteered that technically they did not approve of the plan, but morally they did. This response proved a bit too much for one of the members of the committee who then asked, "Would you say it was given de facto approval?" To which Admiral Burke replied, "Yes." In further interrogation, Admiral Burke was asked, "If it had looked as though they had had an unfeasible plan, /