◆ SpookStack

Whether the new Administration believed in the program which was jointly evolved--a moot point after the collapse of the invasion when political reputations were being protected at all cost--it became obvious almost immediately following his ina~guration that the President was going to have to make some decisions on Cuban policy. Pressures to use the Brigade came not only from the Agency, which had been conducting training activities since June 1960, but also from the Government of Guatemala which provided the air and ground training sites for the Cubans and from the Government of Nicaragua wh.ich had agreed to the use of Puerto Cabezas as the operational base for launching the invasion of Cuba. Whatever else concerned the Kennedy administration during the period between 22 January 1961 when the principal cabinet members first were briefed by CIA on the details of the anti-Castro plan until the evening of 16 April 1961 when--after consultation with Secretary of State Rusk--the President cancelled the D-Day air strike, the planned anti-Castro operation was a burr under its saddle and could not be wished away. The increasing concern about the problem improved cooperation between the Agency and the Department of Defense, and DOD's support for the operation increased as JCS evaluations indicated that the chances for success were greater than for failure. On the other side, the Department of State