◆ SpookStack

As an appropriate final note to indicate the dominant role of the Agency in determining US foreign policy vis-a-vis Nicaragua, a cable of 15 April 1961 from Managua to Headquarters reads;oas follows: Napoli requests know, if Ambassador Brown, who ETA Managua 16 April, briefed on JMATE/JMTIDE. If not, does Headquarters authorize briefing if Ambassador so requests. 70/ 0 This was a strange question to have to be asked of Wash- ington at this particular time. Even stranger, perhaps, is the fact that the Department of State was scheduling a new Ambassador to arrive at the time that the planned attack on Cuba being assigned out of the country to which he was was about to kick off. Whether this was an indication of relative indifference on the part of the Department or a sign of supreme confidence in the ability of its personnel to cope is left to the reader's jUdgment. H. Postscript on Nicaragua Two interesting postscripts to the story of the Agency's involvement in Nicaraguan foreign policy con- cern the period following the collapse of the invasion. In May 1961, Lou Napoli was informed by former Ambassador - 143 -