◆ SpookStack

The picket would not only assuage Somoza's fears, but would be insurance against any unorthodox surprise attack on TIDE.* The emergency cable from TIDE to Headquarters recommended that the radar picket be established by 0800 local time 15 April 1961, or as soon as possible thereafter; and it also suggested that instructions be provided for communications to link the Navy picket with both TIDE and Managua. 64/ One of the few points of contention between the Agency representatives and the highest officials of the Nicaraguan government occurred at the time that the operation was being mounted at Puerto Cabezas. One of the Garcia Lines ships -- the Lake CharZes which was to be one of the backup ships of the invasion fleet -- arrived in Puerto Cabezas where 10 of her Cuban crew membe~s were detained as potential prO- Castro security risks. These crew members were re- moved from the Lake CharZes and turned over to Captain * The idea suggested by General Somoza -- that bombs might be rolled out the doors of Cubana airlines C-47's or other transport aircraft -- undoubtedly struck a familiar note with the air ops people at TIDE. After all, they had tried to develop a make-shift napalm bomb to be rolled out -- or dropped out on a pallet -- of a C-46 or C-54. (See Volume I, Air Operations.)