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, Castro to recuperate lost prestige and rally local and foreign sympathy and sup- port. Generally speaking, current area attitudes toward the Castro regime are satisfactory from our (CIA] point of view. However, this could change radically and rapidly, if there are any premature para- military actions. When the time comes for paramilitary activity, we should make every effort to conceal any invasion actions. To avoid or minimize Castro·s counter propaganda, the paramilitary operations must appear to be an inter~~Z uprising by dissident elements ~ithin Cuba. This, of course, would require clandestine infiltration of personnel pnd arms before the hostitlities begi~. .In my opinion, Castro will inevitably charge the US with responsibility for JMARC operations, and many Latin Americans and other foreign observers will be in- clined to accept such charges with or without supporting evidence. Therefore, what we need is a massive diversionary effort that will either obscure the fact of our involvement or make our involvement palatable. This diversionary tactic might be accomplished by exploiting unanimous Latin American revulsion toward the Trujillo regime ••• If it became known, or strongly suspected, that we were supporting opera- tions to bring about a transition to cerna- cratic government in the Dominican Repub~ic, the waters would be suitably muddied, and a climate prepared for the Cuban effo=t.* 62/ * Debatable though Oberst's philosophy regarding the Dominican Republic might be, serious attention to his initial comments regarding paramilitary activities against Castro might have halted -- or at least seriously altered -- the operations which would ul~ima~ely con- clude at the Bahia de Cochinos. As with ober of the cautionary and restrained proposals whic~ w~ulc be put forth prior to launching the invasion, little heed (footnote continued on follQwi:~S page) . - 87 - lOP Sh(.~FT