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.J:QP 3t!CI~E I With reference to his action of 17 March 1960, President Eisenhower subsequently wrote: this result." Merchant then went on to review the bidding that had already been done, particularly in the Special Group, on the question of how to handle Castro, emphasizing, of course, that State was very much concerned that precipitate action against Castro's government would work, if not immediately, certainly in the long run, to the detriment of the United States, particularly in its relations to the other governments of Latin America. Whether the response did not satisfy Admiral Burke or whether he sincerely believed that the Navy, more than any other US Agency, should be principally responsible for setting US policy toward Cuba is not known. In any event, on 16 March 1960, he forwarded another set of proposals for US action in Cuba to both Gordon Gray, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and to Allen W. Dulles. Burke's comments on the transmittal sheets to these two individuals are interesting. To National Security Adviser Gray he wrote: Dear Gordon: Enclosed is my copy of a memorandum on U.s. Action in Cuba which may be of interest to you. Sincerely yours, Arleigh Burke. To the Director of Central Intelligence he wrote: Dear Allen: Enclosed is a memorandum my Staff prepared containing some sugges- tions which might be useful to you in your work. Naturally, I do not agree with quite all the comments contained in the memorandum but I know that you will for- give the impatient young lad for his de- sire to make sure no opportunity is left uncovered. Warm regards. Sincerely, Arleigh Burke. Why one of the recipients was cautioned about "the im- patient young lad" and the other was not is something (footnote continued on following page) - 77 - ;rap SEC~ FT rd , ,