◆ SpookStack

••II II II II II II• "deniabi1ity" would be the albatross around the necks of Agency planners; and from D-Day minus 2, (~:~i 15 April 1961) it became the strangling cord insuring the failure of the effort at the Bay of Pigs. This volume describes the Agency's organization designed to accomplish the assigned task; and it records the interaction between the Agency and other government components (State and the military in 'particular), between the Agency and the White House, and among various CIA components as the program evolved. The relationships we~e sometimes less than harmonious. Particular attention is focused on the roles played ~ both President Eisenhower who author~ ized the anti-eastro program and Vice President Nixon who has been charged time and again --.unjustifiably as the reccrd reveals -- with being the mastermind behind the operation. Emphasis also is focused on the drastic change in the concept of the operation between the spring and fall ott 1960. From April's plans for the infil- tration infuo Cuba of small teams of Agency trained specialists in communications, sabotage, and para- military operations to provide training and guidance ...., - iv - ~p SEERET