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, :rop 3ECRE I at this particular time. According to his own report of his position at this meeting, Mr. Gray pointed out that it would be unwise to mount any kind of an operation without the determination to see it through and that an abortive effort would be worse than no effort at all. He there- fore thought that if this backup force was essential to ultimate success, full consideration should be given to it at this stage in the planning. Mr. Dulles again urged that a decision on this be deferred.* 91/ In support of Mr. Gray and in some contradiction to Mr. Bissell's view that perhaps the Cuban PM force would be able to carry off the effort without any out- side help, the President was reported to have indicated that He would go along so long as the Joint Chiefs, Defense, State, and CIA think we have a good chance of being successful. He wouldn't care much about this kind of cost [the $10 million inc~ease noted earlier]; indeed, he said he would de- fend this kind of action against all corners and that if we could be sure of freeing the Cubans from this incubus, $25 million might be a small price to pay. * In light of today's relations between the united States and other of the major world powers with the third countries, Gordon Gray displayed -- in the summer of 1960 -- a degree of foresight with which he has never been properly credited. For he noted at that time that if the US failed to deal firmly with Cuba, there was an obvious danger that other small nations would be encouraged to undertake harass- ments of the major powers. 92/ -109 - TOP SECUET