◆ SpookStack

capt. Burns W. epresentative of OSOI DOD, concluded among other things that "the conference with Capt. Spore accomplished little, other than to point up the difficulty of obtaining future DOD sup- port under the present circumstances." 79/* On 29 November 1960, a request to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for special operations went for- ward for the DDP requesting: two operational staff officers who were "recently qualified in air to ground gunnery, rocketry •.. and capable of tactical mission planning"; two operations support officers who had "recent experience in tactical mission planning"; and six weapons maintenance supervisors and one aircraft * It was at this meeting on 25 November 1960, that Jake Esterline strongly suggested that the reluctant attitude exhibited by Capt. Spore towards supporting Project JMATE was a reflection of the pressures that were being exerted by the Department of State which was squeamish about OAS and UN discovery of Agency involvement in the anti-Castro activity. Spore's contention was that DOD was being asked to buy a pig in a poke and that the problems could be resolved if WH/4 would provide more detailed briefings concerning its plans. An interesting note is that reporting on this, and other of the sessions betweenWH/4 and OSO, was the responsibility of Col. John F. Mallard (USMC), a military assignee to WH/4 responsible for liaison with the DOD. Mallard's reporting throughout the operation reflects high credit on his integrity for it reflects the pros and cons of all parties positions -- and could easily have put him between "a rock and a hard place." Mallard's career may, in fact, have suffered. He refused the author's request for an oral interview, and he declined to respond to written questions.