◆ SpookStack

As the decision was made to shift to the B-26, there was a sudden increase in correspondence con- cerning the acquisition of these aircraft. One of the immediate questions that came up in a meeting between representatives of WH/4 and DPD was that of the need for a backup aircraft to support the B-26's. In view of what subsequently developed over the beach at Playa Giron in April 1961, it was unfortunate that this question did not receive far greater attention than it did in late August of 1960. The question being discussed was whether the backup should be provided by fighter aircraft or whether there should be additional B-26's acquired for the strike force. 45/* * The question of backup support for the B-26's presented problems to the air operations officers who had Oral History interviews with the author. Both ColoneL'Beerli and Gaines pointed out that if the air operations had been conducted as ini- tially structured, there would have been no need for backup Dighter aircraft because Castro would not have had any aircraft in the air. It is inter- esting to observe, however, "that the discussion referenced in the text above took place in late July 1960" -- well prior to the time that any planned attack on the strategic targets had been fully devel- oped or, perhaps, even partially developed. Knowing that the Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria (FAR) had both T-33 jet trainers and Sea Fury fighters in its inventory there seemed to be little point in suggesting that additional B-26's try to fly cover for those employed in bombing Cuba. - 37 -