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emotional Cubans, already under the great tension which precedes immediate entry into battle. Then we had to do some fast work to pick up the pieces and thus do what we could to salvage the operation and mitigate the terrible difficulties facing it. When we first got word of the cancel- lation, Mr. Bissell and I had agreed that the time had passed to turn back the land- ing force and so cancel the entire opera- tion. The landing force was already enter- ing the area of expected enemy observation and its U.S. Naval escort was dropping back. An order at this time to turn back, might not have been received, and if it had been, there would have been questions at least and possibly refusals to obey, in either case, with resulting serious con- fusion -- all in the face of the enemy. (This too I explained to the Secretary of State.) Whereas, had the decision to cancel the air strike been received a few hours before we would have had the option of cancelling the whole operation. At this late hour we had no such option. 136/ In contrast to the memorandum which he and Mr. Bissell signed jointly on 9 May 1961 explaining the cancellation of the second strike, in this undated version Cabell emphasized that Kennedy's mind had been made up at the time that CIA ~as informed that the strike ~as off; and it ~as a decision ~hich had been reached ~ithout consulting anyone in the Agency. The handwritten notes also emphasized the obvious, that military success was no longer the principal - 293 -