◆ SpookStack

Shortly after 0100 hours Washington time on 17 April 1961, Stan Beerli sent a cable to TIDE, which read in part as follows: Complete plan amended to place all B-26 aircraft at disposal of Brigade Commander, and Task Force protection. Targets outlined in Ops Plan 200-1, Attachment #1, Appendix 2 to Annex B. are cancelled. 119/ The TIDE acknowledgment of the receipt of Beerli's cable clearly reflected discouragement on the part of Thorsrud, the Chief of Air Operations at the strike base. It read in part: 1. Refs received and reluctantly com- plied with. Complete plan amendment per refs received 170715Z [0115 hours local time; 0215 hours Washington, D.C. time] with all pilots in cockpit ready for start engines. Needless to say this less than desirable operating procedure when 12 aircraft timed for take off between 0730Z and 0800Z. " 2. Realize it desired to give maximum protection to Brigade, however, believe per [sial change will not afford as much protection as original strike plan. The only real offensive danger to the Brigade is enemy fighters and bombers which are better hit on their home field --not (repeat not) over the beachhead. 120/ In this same cable, Thorsrud went on to request authorization to launch an airfield strike five minutes before sunset on D-Day; and he also requested permission - 278 -