◆ SpookStack

On Sunday morning, I was Washington had finally said suant [sic] of that line of inquiry would not be fruitful. It was then clear that our Saturday statement had been false. I p~epared a Top Secret telegram of complaint from Stevenson to the Secretary (or the President) and, accompanied by Wm. Bowdler, now Ambassador to Pretoria, took it to Gov. Stevenson at the Waldorf. I told him the Saturday statements had been false and showed him - the telegram, which he signed -- probably, though I do not remember for sure, with changes of his own. He was understand- ably very disturbed.* After we left, he must have called the President or the Secretary, or both. In any case, McGeorge Bundy then came to New York. As I recall, they had breakfast Monday morning, which I believe was when the invasion was taking place. My impres- sion is that the timing was determined so that he [Stevenson] would only be told after the invasion was already underway. I do not know what Stevenson was then told, or what he said about possible air strikes. But as both the President and he by then had said that nothing would take place from u.S. territo!ry, and that no u.S. forces would be involved, he certainly must have been opposed and must at that point have been consulted about the strike. * Stevenson's protest apparently had little or no impact on the Department for a cable was sent to him on Monday, 17 April 1961 at 1213 hours, providing him with some "language for contingency use if Cubans make show with bomb and rocket fragments [from attack on D-2]." 95a/ - 259 -