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, Schlesinger) in 1961. The answers to your specific questions are explicitly "no" in each case.* In fact, the briefing totally misled Amb. Stevenson, Amb. Plimpton, and me as to the scope and timing of what was under- way. The effect of the briefing was this: (1) that the CIA was involved in plans for an internal uprising on the island. (This had to have included mention of outside Cuban assistance though I do not now remember this as a fact.) (2) That nothing would happen from US territory. (3) That no US forces or personnel would be involved. (4) That whatever happened, would have the appearance of an internal Cuban event. (5) That nothing would happen dur- ing the session of the General Assembly, then underway. (I asked this question myself. ) * The questions were to determine if Stevenson was told that: 1) there would be an air strike against Castro's airfields on D-2 (15 April 61); 2) there would be an invasion of Cuba by a force of some 1,200 anti-Castro Cubans; 3) th~re would be an air strike (or a series of air strikes) on D-Day (or on D-Day and subsequently as necessary) against a series of tactical targets; 4) the actual date of the D-2 air strike was 15 April or that the upcoming invasion was set for 17 April. - 256 -