◆ SpookStack

oa ga a aa ee oo instance, I am not quite clear what are the duties of the PM types there since this component is neither a headquarters nor a training installation nor even a forward command past.” And in another memo in November, he again urged that WH/4 be especially careful to avoid any duplication of effort between Miemi and Headquarters. Duplication of Effort 5. By this time there was plenty of duplication. Head- quarters and the Miami Base had become engaged in many parallel or overlapping operations and were even competing with each other. Both components were handling all kinds of agents and in Some cases the same ones. The only activity that Miami did not get into was air cperations, but even here it necessarily had a role in many of the clendestine air drops. 6. There was a general feeling at Headquarters that the forward base existed solely for support and that Headquarters was in the best position to handle operations because it had ready access to policy guidance and fast radio communications to and from all elements. This view ignored the fact that much of the communication with Cuba was only by secret writing and couriers; that Miami was the main source of information, poli- ticians, agents ,» and soldiers for the projects that it was the logical location for infiltration and exfiltration; that the base, through the maintenance of effective liaison, had the