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| ae eee aan a hme cen en a elements from U.S. air bases at the rate of two flights a week. Only the first authorization was given at that time. 10. In mid-January 1961 various major policy questions were, at CIA's request, under discussion by the Special Group. These included: (a) use of American contract pilots for tactical and logistical air operations over Cuba; (b) use of a U.S. air base for logistical flights to Cuba; (c) commencement of air strikes not later than dawn of the day before the amphibious assault and without curtailment of the number of aircraft to be employed from those available; (a) use of Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, as an air-strike base and maritime staging area. ll. In the end only one of these policy questions was resolved in the affirmative, that with regard to the use of Puerto Cabezas. It should be especially noted that the project's paramilitary chief had strongly recommended that the operation be abandoned if policy should not allow adequate tactical air support. Conflicting Views le. The raising of these questions and the failure to resolve many of them demonstrates the dangerous conflict between the desire for political acceptability and the need for military effectiveness. It also indicates the fluctuat- ing policy background against which the officers running the = 4g - im OeRepelnaeerelion