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ADocumentaryHistoryOfTheCubanMissileCrisis1962
Page 76
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21. (Continued)
would accept the responsibility for providing the answers to the Secretary
of State, aid that he had scheduled a meeting that afternoon with
Mr. James Reber, the Chairman of COMOR, in order to obtain the
answers,
4, With the above background to the meeting, it is apparent
that the primary concern was to insure that there would be no incidents
involving a U-2 in the overhead reconnaissance of Cuba. (You will recall
that it was at this time that there had been two U-2 incidents~-one over
China and one over Sakhalin--which had caused considerable noise level. )
The meeting opened with an analysis of the risk of incidents involved in
the Agency's proposal for two extended overflights covering the remainder
of Cuba which had not been covered in the 29 August and 5 September
missions. Mr. Rusk asserted that although the information was needed,
everything should be done to minimize the risk element and avoid a third
incident. He urged that the routes be so designed as to have the U-2's
over the Island the minimum possible time, and there was general
discussion on the desirability of avoiding the SAM sites. The Secretary
of State also made the point that he did not wish to have overflights mixed
with peripheral flights, as he wished to maintain the right to fly over
international waters with peripheral flights. He raised the question as
to whether some of the needed coverage couldn't be obtained from
peripheral flights with oblique photography.
5. The CIA representatives showed the members of the group
a map of Cuba and the planned routes. The SAM sites which had already
been identified were pointed out and it was noted that the routes planned
would avoid these sites. It was noted, however, that there could be new
sites which had not yet been identified along the planned routes. The
CIA representatives also stressed the importance of the intelligence
requirements. Messrs, Bundy and Rusk indicated that the group would
not object to the overflights provided there were no incidents and that
the routes taken over the land mass of Cuba were the shortest possible
and avoided the surface-to-air missile sites,
6. The minutes of this meeting were prepared on the next day by
Mr. Tom Parrott who did not atterd the meeting,
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director
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