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ADocumentaryHistoryOfTheCubanMissileCrisis1962
Page 55
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12. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Memorandum for the Director, “Action
Generated by DCI Cables Concerning Cuban Low-Level
Photography and Offensive Weapons” (n. d.i
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Action Generated by DCI Coble EEE oncesning
Cuban Low-Level Photography an ensive Weapons
1, Based upon your proposal of Saturday, 25 August, that De,
RF-10l's be used over Cuba, General Carter asked General Lemnitzer 7
on 27 August about the possibility of low~level photography using
pS RF-101 or F8U aircraft. At that time General Lemnitzer indicated
, that something probably could be dug up. General Carter informed :
; USIB at the 29 August meeting of his conversation with General yo
| Lemnitzer, At the Special Group Meeting the following day, General :
; Lemnitzer raised the issue and said that use of RF -101 or F8U air-
t craft flown by US pilots would be feasible from the military point of
view. General Carter pressed the point by indicating that other types
of photography did not give sufficient detail and precise identifica-
tion of certain types of equipment. After some discussion, the
|
|
Group agreed to take cognizance of this matter and requested it be
reopened at an appropriate time when specific targets and informa-~
tion needs could be identified.
2. On 31 August, after General Carter informed Mr. McGeorge
Bundy and General Lemnitzer of the readout of U-2 flights showing
SA-2 sites, the President called ‘General Carter af 1300, asked how
many people had this information, and told General Carter that he
wished it put back in the box and nailed tight. This freeze continued
until Saturday, 1 September, when the information was extended
slightly further to the working analysts. General Carter informed
Secretary Gilpatric on 1 September that the General and Rarl Kaysen
agreed a full readout was necessary and that some low-altitude flights
were needed to pinpoint the sites.
3. Not until Tuesday, 4 September, did the President announce
the presence of a missile defense system in Cuba. That day General
Carter approved COMOR recommendations: in view of SAM sites on
the western end of the island, it was particularly important that the
next authorized mission should cover those areas of the island which
were not photographed because weather or range did not permit, and
that the complex eastern end of the island should be photographed
again,
39
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