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ADocumentaryHistoryOfTheCubanMissileCrisis1962
Page 354
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112. (Continued)
TOP SECRET BRE
7. Agent reports helped materially; however, none giving
significant information on offensive missiles reached the intelli-
gence community or policy-makers until after mid-September,
When received, they were used in directing aerial photography.
a, Some restrictions were placed on disaemination of
information, but there is no indication that these restrictions
necessarily affected analytical work or actiona by policy-makers.
9. The 19 September estimate, while indicating the im~
probability that the Soviet Union would place MRBM's and IRBM's
in Cuba, did state that "this contingency must be examined care-
fully, even though it would run counter to current Soviet policy'';
the estimators in preparing the 19 September estimate gave great
weight to the philosophical argument concerning Soviat intentions
and thus did not fully weigh the many indicators,
10. The estimate of 19 October on probable Soviet reactions
Was correct.
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