◆ SpookStack

4, (Continued) 7. On September 7th, McCone wired General Carter as follows; "Question very much if C-package will be helpful Cuba and urge frequent repeat missions of recent veconnaissance operations which Gilpatric advises informative. Also I support use of R-10l if necessary, My bunch is we might face prospect of Soviet short- Tange surface-to-surface missiles of portable type in Cuba which could command important targets of southeast United Staes and possibly Latin American Caribbean areas, You might suggest to Rusk that we develop joint policies for action in Cuba with selected Caribbean, South-American states as an alternative to seeking unanimous OAS action which most certainly will be an ineffective compromise solution if past history is any indicator." 8, On September i0th MeCone wirad Carter Fe: follows: "Difficult for me to rationalize extensive costly defonses being established in Cuba as such extreme costly measures to accomplish security and secrecy not consis~ tent with other policies such as refugees, legal travel, etc. Appears to me quite poasible measures now being taken are for purpose of insuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as MRBMaz to be installed by Soviets after present phase completed and country secured from overflights. Suggeet BNE sudy motives behind these defensive measures which even seem to exceed those provided most satellites," 9. On September 13th McCone received communication from Carter stating that the BNE continued to feel that the installation of SA 2s is most reasonably explained by other than a desire to hide MRBM build-up, To this McCone responded on September 13th as follows: “Also I continue to be concerned that the establishment of defensive equipment and installations is merely a prelude to the location of an offensive weapon capability and ones this ia done the implementation of